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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis begins with the premise that the life and work of a composer need not 
necessarily be considered in contemporary musicological criticism as distinct 
entities; rather, this thesis sets out to demonstrate that the life and work of a 
composer can, within the appropriate critical constraints, be mutually informative 
sources of information and may be even considered as inextricably linked. The first 
part of this thesis identifies the historical reasoning behind the rejection of biography 
by traditional musicologies – namely the perception that biography is both unrelated 
to musicological enquiry and not a critically viable/empirical source of information. 
The trend in contemporary ‘critical’ musicology away from less dogmatic and 
empirical modes of criticism and towards more subjective lines of enquiry is used as 
a foundation upon which a new methodology (that allows biographical insight to 
function meaningfully within musicology) can be built. This methodology is named 
‘musico-psychobiography’ as it proposes that the nascent interpretive field of 
psychobiography might be better suited to a theoretical construction that demands 
critical reliability and analytical rigour than traditional conceptions of biography. 
The first part of this thesis concludes with an exegesis of the key theoretical 
objections to this pursuit, and offers counterpositions to them in order to secure a 
stable methodological process. 
The second part of this thesis is dedicated to the practical exploration of this 
methodology by means of a case study of composer Maurice Ravel and his opera 
L’Enfant et les sortilèges. A close reading of the psychological dynamics articulated 
by L’Enfant in conjunction with an assessment of key psychobiographical saliences 
in operation in Ravel’s life leads us to a number of interesting conclusions; 
moreover, by modifying the psychodynamic concept of projective identification to 
apply to a composer and their work, we are able to explore in a different light the 
dynamics of interaction between Ravel and his opera. 
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 2 
1 
Reposing the ‘vexed question’ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The title of this chapter came about as a result of my desire to respond to remarks 
made by Maynard Solomon on the value of musical biography to contemporary 
musicological endeavour.1 Given that we now find ourselves in the intellectual age of 
a ‘critical’ or ‘new’ musicology2 – a musicology whose ethos is derived from the 
humanities’ postmodern call to resituate the notion of subjectivity (which, as we will 
see, surely operates in both the domain of the receiver and the creator of the work) at 
                                                            
1 It should be noted that my main concern in this thesis is with critical musicology, 
although this chapter does address the historical relationship between ‘traditional’ 
musicology and biography. I place the term ‘traditional’ in quotation marks to 
denote its reference to trends in musicological scholarship prior to 1980. Though I 
am aware that there can exist no absolute, concrete dividing line between ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ musicologies, 1980 was the year in which Joseph Kerman published his 
seminal article ‘How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out’, which called 
for the changes in musicology to which I refer here. For the purpose of clarity in 
this discussion, a distinction will therefore be made between critical/new 
musicology (contemporary/post-1980), and ‘traditional’ musicology (pre-1980). 
2 In terms of their shared ideological agenda (as opposed to their historical 
relationship to developments within musicology), I will consider in this thesis the 
terms ‘critical’ musicology and ‘new’ musicology to be synonymous. Again, for 
clarity, I will use the term ‘critical’ musicology to denote scholarship post-1980, 
unless I state otherwise. 
 3 
the forefront of critical enquiry3 – Solomon’s remarks demand an especially urgent 
response. 
Solomon asserts that ‘the primary area of dispute about the value of 
biography appears to centre on the vexed question of how – or whether – the 
pathways between life and art can be mapped, whether a “personal” factor in 
creativity can be identified’.4 In summarising this dispute as a ‘vexed question’, 
Solomon has also fittingly described the intellectual status of musical biography 
according to a substantial volume of contemporary musicological discourse, in 
addition to having identified the crux of the ideological constraints that threaten to 
undermine the value of musical biography to critical musicology. In this chapter, I 
will show how a number of these intellectual positions have been inherited from 
traditional musicological thought, and I will explore in Chapter Three the reasons 
why some are still to be found in contemporary musicological discourse. 
The goal of this thesis is to propose a new methodology that will allow what 
we might for the moment call ‘biographical insight’ into composers and their musical 
works to function meaningfully in conjunction with the discursive and multivalent 
practices of critical musicology. The vehicle by which I intend to convey this is a 
methodology I call ‘musico-psychobiography’ – I will go on to outline this in more 
detail in Chapter Two. The biographical insight I refer to in this case may be said to 
comprise any information bearing at least a superficial pertinence to the composer 
‘themselves’ – in other words, information concerning the minutiae of ‘the life’ as 
opposed to ‘the work’ (but it is worth remembering that in this thesis the apparent 
                                                            
3 Various musicologists have noted this subjective element in critical musicology. 
Susan McClary, for example, considers music as ‘a medium that participates in 
social formation by influencing the ways we perceive our feelings, our bodies, our 
desires, our very subjectivities – even if it does so surreptitiously, without most of 
us knowing how’; Lawrence Kramer consistently makes reference to music’s 
‘worldly meaning’ in order to describe how music can embody social and political 
meaning, and to allow the subjective element in the creation and perception of 
those meanings to be defined. McClary, ‘Constructions of Subjectivity in 
Schubert’s Music’, 211–12; see Cook, Music: A Very Short Introduction, 114. 
4 Solomon, ‘Biography’, in Grove Music Online (accessed 5 May 2012). Emphasis 
added. 
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boundary between the life and the work will be tested). In order to achieve this goal 
– and since this is a contentious topic that has been curiously neglected within 
contemporary musicological discourse – I intend to repose this ‘vexed question’ from 
a fresh critical perspective. In searching for an answer, I will examine what 
constitutes its vexed-ness and interrogate anew the pervasive ideological constraints 
that hinder my pursuit. 
This chapter is intended to explore in an historical context the complexities of 
the relationship between musical biography and both ‘traditional’ and critical 
musicologies as they have developed over time. Chapter Two will provide an 
overview of the key methodological processes involved in psychobiography – 
musico-psychobiography being the interpretive strategy I propose to replace 
‘traditional’ biography with (I will also explain in a moment why I place the word 
traditional in quotation marks). Chapter Three will comprise exegeses of the 
ideological positions and counterpositions that are central to the theoretical 
construction of the methodology I am proposing in this thesis. Therefore, the goal of 
Part One of this thesis is to arrive at a point where, within a critical/theoretical 
framework, it can be determined that both biographical insight and critical 
musicological enquiry may cohabit within the same interpretive sphere. I will 
demonstrate in the practical application of my methodology (which is performed in 
Part Two) that the resultant relationship offers to further enrich our subjective 
understanding and interpretation of both a composer’s musical works and the life that 
produced them. Moreover, I will posit as a more general conclusion that the areas of 
the life and the work, which are widely accepted in musicological criticism and 
elsewhere as disparate entities, can in certain cases be critically demonstrated as 
being mutually informative and inextricably connected. The implications arising 
from the outcomes of each chapter will then return us equipped with some semblance 
of an answer to the ‘vexed question’ with which we began this thesis. 
During the course of this chapter, the term biographical insight (and its 
traditionalist connotations) will be metaphorically discarded in favour of the more 
appropriate concept of psychobiographical insight. Psychobiography, as I briefly 
referred to above, is a psychologically orientated methodology that emanates from 
the field of personality psychology, and while it pursues roughly the same goals as 
biography – as William Todd Schultz, a leading contemporary psychobiographer, 
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puts it, psychobiography’s chief concern is with ‘the understanding of persons’,5 
which seems to adequately summarise the ultimate purpose of any biography – the 
reasoning behind my rejection of ‘traditional’ biographical insight comes about since 
the emergent field of psychobiography still provides us with the biographical insight 
we seek, yet its methodology is so designed that its insights are based upon a far 
sturdier critical foundation than that of ‘traditional’ biography. I use the term 
‘traditional’ to explain the sense of musical biography’s perceived lack of theoretical 
reliability in making interpretations of musical works within the context of life 
events, or vice versa – examples of this perception from a musicological perspective 
are provided in the discussion below. I will argue in Chapter Two that since 
psychobiography’s methodology is founded upon theoretical psychological and 
psychoanalytical rigour, it is more capable of withstanding the theoretical objections 
to the presence of biographical insight within critical musicological investigation that 
are identified and explored in Part One. Hence, psychobiographical insight carries 
with it a more appropriate critical gravitas when compared against traditional forms 
of biography. 
A proposal to explore the practice of psychobiography with a view to 
including it within critical musicology’s wide-ranging assemblage of interpretive 
techniques is the first of its kind in contemporary musicological discourse. This may 
appear surprising when we consider first that there is little to compare the practice of 
psychobiography to in the field of critical musicology6 – we might ask why a 
                                                            
5 Schultz, ‘Introducing Psychobiography’, 3. 
6 Little does not, however, mean nothing. As Hans Lenneberg’s article on musical 
biography in Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart (MGG) states: ‘Another 
category of biography in the twentieth century is psychohistory or 
psychobiography.... While Maynard Solomon’s Beethoven (1977) was received 
with critical acclaim, an earlier psychoanalytic study of Editha and Richard 
Sterba’s, Beethoven and His Nephew (1954), was not. Although numerous similar 
books were published, psychoanalytic methods did not generally prevail as an aid 
to understanding music. The eminent biographer Jacques Barzun … has dealt with 
psychohistory, etc., in ‘Truth and Biography’ (in Critical Questions, 182–192; 
1950) and in Clio and the Doctors (1974)’. Lenneberg, ‘Biographik’, in MGG 
(1994), 1: 1550. «Eine weitere Kategorie der Biographik des 20. Jh. Ist die 
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precedent has not yet been sought out – and second that (as will be demonstrated in 
Part Two) the combined forces of psychobiography and critical musicology (or 
musico-psychobiography) offer to further elucidate and interpret meaning in/of 
musical works. This latter function alone, the elucidation of meaning through 
interpretation, surely describes the prevailing impetus behind all critical 
musicological inquiry. Chapter Two will demonstrate that psychobiography meets 
the same broad methodological criteria – and meets them in largely the same manner 
– as do other critical musicological interpretive practices, and after having pre-
empted some of the important philosophical and theoretical objections to the 
inclusion of biographical insight within critical musicological practices in Chapter 
Three, the case will be made in the remainder of this thesis for its subsequent 
acceptance into the interpretive canon. 
To summarise, the ensuing chapters of Part One (which is entitled 
‘Theoretical Construction’) are designed to lay the theoretical foundation upon which 
the case for psychobiography within critical musicology can be built. It is intended 
that a hitherto undeveloped avenue of enquiry will be revealed that may be 
elaborated upon and further developed by future authors. Furthermore, it is hoped 
that my undertaking will offer a meaningful contribution to the field of critical 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Psychogeschichte bzw. Psychobiographie.... Während Maynard Solomon[‘]s 
Beethoven (N.Y. 1977) großes Ansehen erlangt, erreichte eine frühere 
psychoanalytische Studie von Editha und Richard Sterba, Beethoven and his 
Nephew (N.Y. 1954), dieses Ziel nicht. Obwohl noch zahlreiche ähnliche Bücher 
publiziert wurden, konnte sich die psychoanalytische Methodik nicht allgemein 
als Hilfsmittel zum Verständnis von Musik durchsetzen. Der herausragende 
Biograph Jaques Barzun Z.B. (Berlioz and the Romantic Century, Boston/Mass. 
1950) hat sich mit Psychogeschichte u.a. in Truth and Biography (in: ders., 
Critical Questions, Chicago 1982, S. 182–192) und in Clio and the Doctors 
(Chicago 1974) auseinandergesetzt.» For clarity, I have only included the year of 
publication in the citations appearing in the translation; full citations appear in the 
original German text below it. Translations in this thesis are my own, unless 
otherwise stated; untranslated quoted matter appears in footnotes between 
«guillemets». 
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musicology by means of the example this thesis is designed to set. 
 
 
Exploring the historical relationship 
between biography and musicology 
 
In this section, the changing nature of the relationship between biography and 
musicology over time will be contextualised within an historical framework. The 
reasons behind the difficulty of traditional musicology accepting biography as a 
legitimate form of scholarship are presented here in order to provide a context for the 
remaining two chapters of Part One, where a remedy for this situation is sought by 
means of addressing the ideological constraints that have resulted in this difficulty, 
and which still cause it today. The next chapter will introduce the concept of musico-
psychobiography as an interpretive strategy, and as a replacement for traditional 
conceptions of biography, but before we move on, our starting point is to expound on 
the historical relationship between traditional musicology and traditional musical 
biography in order to contextualise the reasons behind choosing psychobiography 
over the form of biography to which musicology is accustomed. 
Let us begin by considering in closer detail Solomon’s article on the subject 
of musical biography, which I quoted from at the beginning of this chapter. Solomon 
describes musical biography in the following terms: 
In its broadest view, biography is the life history of an 
individual: it therefore may be said to involve the totality of 
phenomena impinging upon or shaping the individual, every 
event participated in or generated by the individual’s 
activities, as well as every aspect of the subject’s mental and 
psychological processes and every product of his or her 
creativity. Music biography centres on the documentation and 
interpretation of events, influences and relationships in a life, 
but its legitimate field of inquiry extends to the biological and 
ancestral inheritance, the social and historical nexus, the 
musical tradition and the intellectual milieu. Thus, music 
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biography is inextricably joined to disciplines such as history, 
mythology, music history, genealogy, sociology and 
psychology.7 
Despite the fact, then, that the conceptual reach of musical biography may be 
legitimately extended beyond the mere routine documentation of factual biographical 
information to scrutinise almost any element of the totality of its subject’s life, we 
may find it surprising that musical biography has not yet been fully embraced by 
critical musicology. I say fully, because some facets of critical musicology do deal 
with biographical factors such as sexuality, as in the example of Lawrence Kramer 
below, but in distinct ways to psychobiography’s treatment of biographical factors 
(as we will come to focus on more centrally in Chapter Two). If we consider that it is 
within the remit of musical biography to simultaneously interpret its ‘subject’s 
mental and psychological processes and every product of his or her creativity’ it may 
seem strange that musicology, whose task has always been to interpret and 
understand music, would dismiss such biographical interpretations. Indeed, this 
simultaneous interpretation appears to imply a reciprocal link. Additionally, a 
number of interpretive strategies within critical musicology already concern 
themselves with mental and psychological processes – although more often than not 
these are applied to psychic reflections that exist in the domain of the musical works 
themselves (see the example of Lawrence Kramer below) – just as some musical 
biographies take to considering these processes on the personal level of the 
composer. 
Despite this apparently promising similarity, critical musicology still appears 
to retain some of the prejudices inherited from traditional musicology, and indeed 
traditional thought on the matter elsewhere in the humanities. If we can regard the 
Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians as a sort of barometer for the 
musicological zeitgeist over the years, it is quite telling that the only entry on 
musical biography to date appears in the latest 2001 edition;8 the previous 1980 
edition (also edited by Stanley Sadie), for example, makes no mention of it. 
Lawrence Kramer’s Franz Schubert: Sexuality, Subjectivity, Song aptly serves 
                                                            
7 Solomon, ‘Biography’, in Grove Music Online (accessed 5 May 2012). Emphasis 
added. 
8 Ibid. 
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to illustrate this dichotomy between biographical interpretation and critical 
musicology. Ian Bent’s prefatory editorial remarks inform the reader that the book 
comes only nine years after Maynard Solomon’s article 
alleging Schubert’s membership of a Viennese homosexual 
subculture – an article which has in the meantime shaken 
Schubert studies to the core. Kramer now brings music 
analysis to bear on the issue of Schubert’s sexual orientation.9 
Kramer’s book concerns itself with the hermeneutic interpretation – a hermeneutics 
that is ‘harnessed to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory’10 – of Schubert’s lieder 
not in explicitly biographical terms, but within the limited context of Schubert’s 
sexuality. Kramer’s book (of 1998) shows that critical musicology has indeed moved 
in the direction of biographical insight, but in a limited way; sexuality may well have 
its roots in the life of a composer, but sexuality is nonetheless a broad characteristic 
that hardly does justice to the details of a life. 
Musical biographies intended for a more general readership continue to 
abound and, moreover, they often propose illuminating theories that posit the same 
assumption that Solomon earlier identified as the locus of musicology’s difficulties 
in the acceptance of musical biography, namely the assumption that the ‘pathways 
between life and art can be mapped’. Solomon has also noted that the potential of 
musical biography has experienced perpetual rejection by musicology. He explains 
that 
biography in the first three quarters of the 20th century 
became peripheral to the concerns of the musicologist and the 
subject tended to fall outside the realm of musicological 
discourse. Its possible significance for musicology has been 
left virtually unexamined in systematic studies of musicology 
or music historiography in the 20th century ...11 
In addition, Hans Lenneberg, in his article on biography in the current edition of Die 
Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart, writes that ‘Guido Adler … editor of the 
                                                            
9 Kramer, Franz Schubert: Sexuality, Subjectivity, Song, xi. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Solomon, ‘Biography’, in Grove Music Online (accessed 5 May 2012). 
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Vierteljahrschrift für Musikwissenschaft … assigned biography the lowest rung in 
historical musicology.’12 
Biographical observations that link the life to the work have therefore 
remained confined to within a biographical genre of music criticism intended for a 
more general readership, largely regarded by critical musicology as non-
transformable to its own field. From a musicological perspective, musical biography 
might well be deemed factually correct in terms of the documentation of its subject’s 
life events, but where musical biography comes to attempt a meaningful 
interpretation of musical works within the context of their composers’ life events, or 
vice versa, such interpretations are perceived for the most part as whimsical 
divertissements that are ineligible for any serious critical scrutiny. 
As Kofi Agawu argued in 1997, almost two decades into the era of new 
musicology (although the term was coined by Kramer in 1990, the approach to which 
he was referring was distinctly post-Kerman), musicology’s renewed focus on the 
individual initially appeared to hold some promise for taking what had previously 
been regarded as biographical whimsy more seriously: 
What has the new musicology achieved so far? One answer 
may be that it has fostered … a new way of construing 
cultural objects.... The reception of music, understood not 
necessarily as an account of other listening subjects (with 
specific histories and geographies), but as an account 
developed around the individual subject, is in in a big way. 
One’s insights need not meet the test of intersubjective 
corroboration; nor do they need to be propped up by what is 
often presented as an over-determined theory-based analysis. 
The fantasies set in motion by biography, be it that of 
composer, performer, or listening subject, need no longer be 
suppressed or even understated.13 
                                                            
12 «G[uido] Adler ... Herausgeber der Vierteljahrschrift für Musikwissenschaft ... der 
Biographik den niedrigsten Rang innerhalb der historischen Musikwissenschaft 
zuzuweisen.» Lenneberg, ‘Biographik’, in MGG (1994), 1: 1545. 
13 Agawu’s tone here does, however, suggest that he is being critical of new 
musicology, perhaps perceiving it to be built on somewhat dubious foundations. 
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Nevertheless, it is clear that even in the age of a new musicology dedicated to the 
re-evaluation of music and musicological practices, few critical musicological works 
have explored the possibility of a meaningful union between musicology and 
biography, and there exists no single work that is explicitly dedicated to this task. 
The complex relationship between life and art is an undeniably contentious subject, 
and yet it appears to have been manifestly neglected in contemporary musicological 
discourse. While biographies of musicians have existed since time immemorial,14 
and while a number of notable modern examples of the genre have introduced 
psychological and psychoanalytical perspectives on the interpretation of life events,15 
few (if any) musicological works have explicitly used biographical information as a 
framework within which to uncover meaning in the subject’s musical works, or vice 
versa.16 
It is important to state, however, that my focus on musical biography is 
somewhat distanced from the discussion of more generalised personal factors such as 
sexuality, as Kramer has focussed on in his discussion of Schubert’s lieder. I am 
proposing an approach that allows for selected details of a life to be addressed, which 
is another reason for privileging psychobiography over traditional biography. As 
Schultz states, ‘[psychobiography] most often targets one facet of a life at a time, a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Agawu, ‘Analysing Music Under the New Musicological Regime’, 301, accessed 
at JSTOR (on 17 February 2012). Emphasis added. 
14 Solomon has argued that ‘the prehistory of musical biography is to be found in 
folklore, myth and theology’, and that ‘from as early as the 10th century, 
compendia and lexica offered brief biographies of musicians’. Solomon, 
‘Biography’, in Grove Music Online (accessed 5 May 2012). 
15 Specifically in relation to the biography of Maurice Ravel, who I will come to 
focus on exclusively in Part Two of this thesis, both Roger Nichols and Gerald 
Larner have produced illuminating biographies with a psychological bent. 
Additionally, Puri has noted that Stuckenschmidt’s Maurice Ravel: Variations on 
His Life and Work hypothesises about Ravel’s sexuality in psychological terms. 
See Puri, ‘Dandy, Interrupted: Sublimation, Repression, and Self-Portraiture in 
Maurice Ravel’s Daphnis et Chloé (1909–1912)’, 1, accessed at JSTOR (on 5 
May 2010). See Resource List for citations of the other works mentioned above. 
16 See footnote 6, p. 5. 
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more or less discrete episode or event or action, not “the” life in all its yawning 
immensity’ 17  – this is a crucial distinction between traditional biography and 
psychobiography. 
One twentieth-century musicologist who addressed the subject – and, if we 
are to take Solomon at his word in describing it as a ‘peripheral concern’, in a way 
that was uncharacteristically direct for the time – was J. H. Elliot. In his article of 
1934 entitled ‘Biography in Musicology’, the opinions Elliot expresses may be taken 
as a representative example of mid-to-late twentieth-century musicological thought 
on the matter, as I will explain. Elliot opined that 
[it] is sometimes considered incumbent upon the 
musicologist to store in his memory ... an accumulation of 
historical fact (and even assumption) which is not directly 
concerned in the technical or aesthetical development of 
music as an art.... [It is] possible to exaggerate the importance 
of biographical details as aids to musical research ... because 
the psychological issues involved are too subtle and 
complicated to permit the precise relationship to be defined.18 
This disparagement of the value of biography is hardly surprising, given the 
musicological and cultural milieu to which Elliot belonged. Musicology in the 1930s 
presaged notions of autonomous, absolute music, which emerged from the sphere of 
structuralist and formalist thought that crystallised in the wake of the Second World 
War. Musicology of the 1930s was thought of in scientific (read: empirical) terms as 
an ‘established scientific discipline’19 or a ‘modern musical science’.20 As Paul 
Henry Láng has identified, ‘the first task of the modern musicologist ... [was to] 
consider the necessary painstaking historical investigation as a mere prelude to the 
real task of the scholar, which is an explanation and interpretation of style’.21 The 
                                                            
17 Schultz, ‘Introducing Psychobiography’, 9. 
18 Elliot, ‘Biography in Musicology’, 50, accessed at JSTOR (on 7 July 2012). 
19 Láng, ‘Recent Trends in Musicological Research’, 15, accessed at JSTOR (on 15 
November 2012). 
20 Adler, ‘Style-Criticism’, 172, accessed at JSTOR (5 November 2012). 
21 Láng, ‘Recent Trends in Musicological Research’, 16, accessed at JSTOR (on 15 
November 2012). 
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emphasis therefore lay with purely musical criteria: ‘those of melody, tonality, 
harmony, polyphony, thematic material, and timbre ... rhythmic and formal 
criteria’.22 
 Equally, musical biographies of Elliot’s time had yet to integrate themselves 
with sophisticated psychological and psychoanalytical theories – as they are able to 
do today with the advent of psychobiography – and as such it is unsurprising that 
Elliot should argue (by implication) that no such satisfactory method existed to even 
attempt to give a definition of the precise relationship he seeks. Elliot goes on to cite, 
as an example, 
[the] relations of the facts concerning Wagner’s behaviour to 
his mistresses, or the unsavoury explanation of Beethoven’s 
ultimate deafness, adds something, however unpleasant it 
may be, to our knowledge. Whether it adds anything to our 
understanding is extremely questionable....23 
We might observe an aside at this point. Firstly, Elliot’s use of the word ‘unsavoury’ 
is intriguing; perhaps it betrays a somewhat prudish attitude toward rumours that 
Beethoven’s deafness may have been the result of some form of venereal disease 
(‘syphilitic affectations’24), alcohol-induced cirrhosis (‘liver trouble’25), or typhus26 
(to name but a few of the numerous hypotheses in circulation during the first quarter 
of the twentieth century). Moreover, that these aspects of pathology have been 
singled out in two of the reviews quoted above of Newman’s The Unconscious 
Beethoven: an Essay in Musical Psychology is indicative of what would be termed 
today as a psychobiographical faux pas: the discussion of a subject’s pathology with 
respect to an investigation attempting to explain their unconscious or psychological 
processes at work points to a temptation to explain the outcomes of the subject’s life 
                                                            
22 Adler, ‘Style-Criticism’, 173, accessed at JSTOR (5 November 2012). 
23 Elliot, ‘Biography in Musicology’, 50, accessed at JSTOR (on 7 July 2012). 
24 Engel, ‘Views and Reviews’, review of The Unconscious Beethoven: an Essay in 
Musical Psychology, 650, accessed at JSTOR (on 30 December 2012). 
25 Whitmer, ‘A Post-Impressionistic View of Beethoven’, 21, accessed at JSTOR 
(on 30 December 2012). 
26 C., review of The Unconscious Beethoven: an Essay in Musical Psychology, 438, 
accessed at JSTOR (on 4 October 2012). 
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in terms of their pathology alone. Schultz calls this ‘pathography’,27 and warns in 
strong terms against it as a reductive and limiting observation. 
 While the unsavoury speculations as to the cause of Beethoven’s deafness, as 
Elliot points out, do not add much to our understanding of his music, the effects of 
his deafness clearly do, as demonstrated by a recent article published in the British 
Medical Journal – the results of which were even the subject of an article in The 
Telegraph.28 The BMJ article states that ‘the periods of Beethoven’s composition – 
the so called three styles – correspond to stages in the progression of his deafness’, 
although the authors are keen to point out that ‘correlation does not imply 
causality’.29 Their conclusion proposes that as Beethoven’s hearing loss progressed 
so too did his preference for middle- and low-frequency tones, and that when 
complete deafness had taken hold, higher frequencies began to reappear in his 
compositions – the authors do, however, concede that such a conclusion is highly 
speculative. This is an example of ‘pathography’ to which we will return in Chapter 
Four. 
 Now returning to Elliot, it is his ensuing phrase that is particularly telling: 
Enlightenment on matters of personal circumstance, or even 
character, does little to elucidate the mysteries of artistic 
creation. Such premises are far too insecure to form bases of 
any reliable deductions; nor are the interactions of 
circumstance upon character sufficiently deniable to yield a 
theory of any practical value.30 
This time in no uncertain terms, Elliot reinforces the view that musical biography, at 
least of his time, was unequipped to reliably interpret life events in the pursuit of 
                                                            
27 The concept of ‘pathography’ is examined in greater detail in Chapter Four. See 
Schultz, ‘Introducing Psychobiography’, 10. 
28 Smith, ‘Beethoven’s Hearing Loss Linked to Lack of High Notes in his Music: 
Research’, The Telegraph (21 December 2011), accessed online (on 28 December 
2012). 
29 Saccenti (et al.), ‘Beethoven’s Deafness and his Three Styles’, accessed online 
(on 28 December 2012). 
30 Elliot, ‘Biography in Musicology’, 52, accessed at JSTOR (on 7 July 2012). 
Emphasis added. 
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elucidating the meaning of a work – we might surmise that today’s more 
sophisticated biographical processes might have provided Elliot with something 
more concrete. 
 For the remainder of his article, Elliot speaks with a tone of reluctance to 
accept what Kramer has today termed under the rubric of hermeneutics as ‘open 
interpretation’, that ‘represents an alternative to both empiricism and dogmatism as 
sources of knowledge’.31 Elliot’s tone is therefore characteristic of the viewpoint 
held by the majority of musicologists during the first half of the twentieth century, 
and indeed certain contemporary ones too – that is, a reliance on the positivistic, as I 
identified above in my appraisal of musicology in the 1930s. However, it is not my 
intention to claim that contemporary critical musicology holds a monopoly on truth, 
or to claim that it is able to elucidate absolute meaning in musical works or their 
reception. Rather, it offers carefully considered and justifiable interpretations – 
musico-psychobiography is the same in this respect, as we will see in Chapter Two. 
We might summarise that Elliot’s musicology was one anticipating the sphere of 
structuralist and formalist thought (part of a conceptual regime which we will 
explore in Chapter Three), whose music was autonomous and absolute, whose 
approach to musicology was precisely that rejected by the new musicologists (as 
identified by Cook), 32  and therefore his preoccupation with empiricism and 
consequent denial of interpretive possibility is quite understandable. By way of a 
conclusion, Elliot writes that ‘on the face of it, it may sometimes appear possible to 
see a connection between a man’s character and his artistic creations; but in such 
cases we need no evidence beyond the works themselves’, and that ‘rough and ready 
assumption is dangerous, and not merely because it is based on current critical 
appraisements’.33 
 As I identified earlier using Kramer’s example, musicology has moved 
towards the acceptance of biographical insight, but it is still considered in generalised 
terms. Lloyd Hibberd’s article, entitled ‘Musicology Reconsidered’, was written only 
25 years after Elliot in 1959, and it demonstrates that tastes had not changed 
particularly dramatically prior to the 1960s: 
                                                            
31 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 2. 
32 Cook, Music: A Very Short Introduction, 113–114. 
33 Elliot, ‘Biography in Musicology’, 52, accessed at JSTOR (on 7 July 2012). 
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Pure biography – that is, a study merely of the life of a 
musician, with no technical discussion of his work – should 
be regarded as biography, not musicology. It may, of course, 
be just as scholarly as any musicological work, but it lies 
outside the latter field because it involves no deep knowledge 
of music. In practice most scholarly biographies of musicians 
do include some discussion of music, which varies according 
to the technical competence of the author and of the readers 
toward whom it is directed. Biography itself may be regarded 
as a special type of either history, or, if it delves into 
character study, psychology; or it may, with the proper 
orientation, belong to sociology. But in its pure state, even 
when its subject is a musician, it is only tangential to music.34 
Solomon, proposing that this lack of attention on the part of musicology might have 
resulted as a reaction against late eighteenth-century aesthetics and the nineteenth-
century cult of the genius, goes on to argue that ‘these presuppositions gave way in 
the 20th century to a wide variety of formalist, sociological and structuralist 
aesthetics which stressed the autonomy of the musical work or its place within a 
particular stylistic tradition or its essential derivation from historical or ideological 
factors.’35 
 In terms of critical musicological practices, though most specifically in 
relation to hermeneutics, it is precisely this idea of a musical work’s autonomy – 
described variously by Savage as ‘absolute music’s sacrosanct aesthetic autonomy’, 
‘music’s institutional preservation’, ‘music’s formal self-sufficiency’ and music’s 
‘transcendent cultural value’36 – to which both hermeneutics and critical musicology 
as a whole are fundamentally opposed. Indeed, at this point it is worth drawing 
attention to one of psychobiography’s similarities to critical musicology in this 
respect. The form of psychobiography employed by this thesis can only be carried 
out if neither the subject of investigation nor the products of their creativity are 
                                                            
34 Hibberd, ‘Musicology Reconsidered’, 29, accessed at JSTOR (on 17 February 
2013). 
35 Solomon, ‘Biography’, in Grove Music Online (accessed 5 May 2012). 
36 Savage, Hermeneutics and Music Criticism, 1. 
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thought to transcend or exclude the other by way of a simultaneously operating 
autonomy – this concept of autonomy will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 
Three, especially with reference to poststructuralist constructions of it. 
 Solomon goes on to conclude that 
[in] the later 20th century, a heightened interest in biography 
as a narrative form of literature combined with a general 
weakening of the authority of traditional belief systems – 
including musicology – revived the willingness to test 
biography as an explanatory tool in the study of creativity. 
Biographers have undertaken to investigate the achievements 
of women and other under-reported groups in music history 
and to explore the implications of sexual orientation upon 
creativity. Studies of musicians and composers by 
psychoanalytically orientated biographers have placed issues 
of fantasy, familial conflict and unconscious sources of 
creativity on the biographer’s agenda.... In the end, the 
primary area of dispute about the value of biography appears 
to centre on the vexed question of how – or whether – the 
pathways between life and art can be mapped, whether a 
‘personal’ factor in creativity can be identified.37 
And so we return full-circle to the ‘vexed question’. Having now outlined in brief the 
historical progression of the relationship between traditional musical biography and 
musicology, it remains to examine the theoretical distinctions between biography and 
psychobiography. Additionally, it must be explained why psychobiography might be 
better suited to the methodology proposed in this thesis (musico-psychobiography). 
This will be achieved by probing the more credible framework within which 
psychobiography cradles its insights, especially compared to the relatively unstable 
support afforded by traditional conceptions of biographical insight.  
                                                            
37 Solomon, ‘Biography’, in Grove Music Online (accessed 5 May 2012). 
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2 
Appropriating psychobiography 
for critical musicology 
 
 
The life and the work 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, biographical insight has a very limited role in 
critical musicology outside of its links to broader understandings of a composer’s life 
such as gender and sexuality. I have shown that musicology, both contemporary and 
traditional, takes issue with utilising specific understandings of the life as an 
interpretive tool, mainly because the close connection it implies between a subject’s 
life and work is regarded as insufficiently demonstrable. Equally, another point of 
contention for critical musicologists is that traditional musical biography, by 
definition, places emphasis on the composer; to emphasise the composer’s biography 
in critical musicological enquiry is to employ a traditionalist composer-centric 
approach, which goes against the critical musicology’s attempts to distance itself 
from the constraints of past criticism. Perhaps the most significant of these 
constraints is the exclusion (particularly in formalist analyses) of meaning that wider 
society can generate in pieces of music over the course of time. The concept of a 
wider society creating meaning in music is encapsulated by reception theory, and the 
traditional approach of emphasising the author is critiqued heavily by the 
poststructuralist philosophies of Roland Barthes and Michael Foucault (amongst 
others). I will return to these ideologies in Chapter Three. 
 To summarise in Solomon’s terms, it is the lack of a demonstrable 
‘“personal” factor in creativity’38 that appears to be the primary cause of biography 
not having been taken up by critical musicology. Biography’s requirement to 
                                                            
38  Ibid. 
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demonstrate this link is the point at which psychobiography comes into its own. A 
similar concern with regard to the ‘personal’ factor in the field of personality 
psychology had been voiced in 1971 when, according to James Clark, ‘Rae Carlson 
raised the crucial question: “Where’s the person in personality research?”’.39 It was 
the field of psychobiography that came to emerge partly in response to Carlson’s 
crucial question. 
 This state of affairs referred to above – the perception that connections cannot 
be drawn between a subject’s life and their works – is quite startling, in no small part 
because psychobiographers have for many years been elucidating an arguably 
demonstrable link between a person’s life and their work; in Schultz’s words, one of 
the central tenets of psychobiography is to ‘uncover the private motives behind 
public acts, whether those acts involve the making of art or the creation of scientific 
theories, or the adoption of political decisions’.40 Psychobiography seeks to do, in a 
more critically sustainable manner, precisely what musical biographies of a 
psychological persuasion seek to do – that is, understand and cogently interpret the 
life and life events of its subject. Moreover, psychobiography demonstrates that a 
person’s life and their public acts are not necessarily, as some would have it, 
mutually exclusive: they are mutually informative. That psychobiography may, under 
the right circumstances and within the right interpretive constraints, elucidate this 
unity is firstly of crucial importance to the development of psychobiography in 
critical musicology, and secondly to the premises of this thesis. 
 
 
Defining musico-psychobiography 
 
In this section, it is intended that a general definition of what psychobiography is, 
what it does, and how it does it will be presented. Further to this, as mentioned 
earlier, I will define and explain the differences between psychobiography and the 
form of psychobiography I wish to posit and utilise in this thesis – as I mentioned in 
the previous chapter, we can think of this specially tailored formulation as musico-
                                                            
39  Clarke, ‘Social Work, Psychobiography, and the Study of Lives’, 83. 
40 Schultz, What is Psychobiography? website (accessed 14 May 2012). 
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psychobiography. 
 Schultz, in the preface to his Handbook of Psychobiography, cites Alan C. 
Elms’s definition of psychobiography: ‘[it] is a way of doing psychology. It’s an 
unusual way, an artful way, a more difficult than easy path, but it is a way’.41 
Psychobiography is indeed an unusual path, but its endpoint – the cogent 
understanding and interpretation of the life and life events of particular subjects – is 
clear. The field is continually evolving, refusing to follow a consistent methodology, 
and it is decidedly non-integrated and somewhat interdisciplinary. In this respect, it is 
strikingly similar to critical musicological enquiry. We might observe a further 
similarity by acknowledging that neither psychobiography nor personality 
studies/psychology are entirely empirical disciplines since both rely to a certain 
extent on subjective elements of art, science, and philosophy. As such, a generic 
definition is somewhat elusive, especially since its methods and meanings are 
different for each psychobiographer and must be adapted depending on the nature of 
the subject in question. The personal and subjective nature of psychobiography 
implied here – a nature that prevents me from claiming its results to be empirically 
verifiable fact, but rather informed interpretations – is explored in more detail in 
Chapter Three with reference to reception theory’s ‘constructing the object of 
enquiry’, and at the beginning of Chapter Five. 
 Addressing the concept of truth in psychobiography, Schultz states that his 
belief is 
that the extreme deconstructionalist [sic] line is dead. 
Psychobiography is a structuralist endeavour. Those 
practicing it assume that motives, scripts, unconscious ideas, 
personality conflicts, and so on are real things – actual, 
knowable mental structures (not ‘author functions’ or 
‘tropes’).42 
This point is a good opportunity to illustrate that musico-psychobiography, 
epistemologically speaking, lies between Schultz’s strongly empirical 
methodological precepts, outlined above, and those of critical musicology, which 
emphasize the role of interpretation on the part of the subjective recipient of the work 
                                                            
41 Schultz, preface to Handbook of Psychobiography, vii. 
42  Schultz, ‘Introducing Psychobiography’, 6. 
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being interpreted. The precepts of critical musicology fundamentally rely on methods 
of interpretation that do not claim to hold monopolies of truth over the works they 
address, and therefore Schultz’s implication that psychobiography uncovers fixed 
meanings must therefore be modified such that the psychobiographical component of 
this thesis is able to acknowledge that its actions are not as dogmatic as Schultz is in 
danger of suggesting. The precepts of musico-psychobiography, which in themselves 
must be modified depending on the varying natures of the works it addresses, is 
given a definition specific to this thesis at the beginning of Chapter Five (this 
reworking is especially necessary in the case of music, where meaning in the 
semantic sense cannot be fixed, since its mode of expression is non-linguistic). 
 Given this element of subjectivity, it is necessary to define as clearly as 
possible what psychobiography means within the subjective context of this thesis – 
and the subjective context of myself – and by doing this it is hoped the specific 
methodology that emerges may serve as an example to be applied to other composers 
and other works; this peculiar flexibility possessed by psychobiography allows it to 
be applied within the field of critical musicology quite successfully, as will be shown 
in Part Two. Psychobiography, however, possesses simultaneously an adaptable 
flexibility and the critical rigour I made reference to earlier – in many ways, that 
psychobiography is a critically rigorous discipline is of crucial importance to its 
success within the field of critical musicology. However, like all critical 
musicological interpretive strategies, psychobiography is still a subjective art of 
interpretation rather than an empirical science. Its critical rigour serves not to 
authorise a position of empirical judgement, but to provide an informed and enriched 
interpretation – this is explored in a practical context at the beginning of Chapter 5. 
 Schultz’s chapter ‘Introducing Psychobiography’ begins by explaining that 
‘the aim of psychobiography is simply stated, though immensely difficult to achieve: 
the understanding of persons’.43 An alternative definition is provided: ‘One seeking 
mind, armed with theory and research, directed at the details of another – that is 
psychobiography’.44 It is this latter definition that provides an apt starting point for 
our formulation of musico-psychobiography. 
 Schultz explains that the practice of psychobiography originated in part as a 
                                                            
43 Ibid., 3. 
44 Ibid. 
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reaction against traditional psychology’s ‘“sicknesses” of reductionism, scientism, 
trivialness [sic], and irrelevance ... [instead] adopting the individual as the primary 
unit of analysis.’45 In castigating psychology so, Schultz is reacting to the perceived 
depersonalisation of psychology and its self-imposed limitation to the point of near 
redundancy. Such opinions have been held by a number of more progressively 
orientated psychologists such as Alan Elms who, after having discovered the virtues 
of psychobiography, championed the appeal to psychologists to join him on his 
journey through a field that promised a route to psychology’s centre, which is the 
understanding of persons in their full complexity.46 Psychology had become, for 
Elms, characterised by the over-generalisation of its theories, reliance on faceless 
statistics, and overall preoccupation with the vagueness of the totality instead of the 
significance of the individual. 
 Schultz summarises his perception of psychology by defining 
psychobiography – perhaps with a somewhat ironic nod to Jacques Lacan – 
‘psychology’s “return of the repressed”’,47 thus relocating his conception, and indeed 
psychobiography’s basis, of the unit of analysis away from the masses and back to 
the individual. As such, psychobiography represents an important new direction in 
personality studies and personality psychology, and critically rigorous 
psychobiographical study is beginning to find its place amongst the scientifically 
respectable main currents of contemporary psychology. 
 Let us consider Schultz’s earlier definition in closer detail, this time with my 
emphases added: ‘One seeking mind, armed with theory and research, directed at the 
details of another…’48 The terms I highlight here are worth exploring individually in 
order to come to our own definition of how musico-psychobiography might operate. 
 One seeking mind refers to the psychobiographer him/herself, but also to the 
psychobiographer as a separate psychological entity, one whose personal 
characteristics and experience may impinge on their subjective interpretations, or 
cause subconscious biased responses to the subject. This is, to a large extent, 
unavoidable in most cases involving a human analyst (perhaps even more so with the 
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human analysand) and this feature relates to the concept of ‘constructing the object 
of our enquiry’, which is discussed in Chapter Three. 
As I have previously drawn a comparison between critical musicology and 
psychobiography in terms of their distinctly non-paradigmatic approaches, the theory 
employed by psychobiography takes the form of an amalgamation of theories and 
methodologies borrowed primarily from the fields of personality psychology and 
psychoanalysis – and, of course, elements of other fields not directly related to the 
subject in hand may be employed if it is deemed necessary or useful to the enquiry. 
 The research in psychobiography refers, in the broadest sense possible, to the 
biographical information on the subject of the investigation. This biographical data, 
if deemed pertinent enough, may take almost any form – in a similar manner to 
traditional musical biography’s ‘totality of phenomena impinging upon or shaping 
the individual’.49 In the case of this thesis, as we will come to in Chapter Four, since 
our subject is deceased, various biographies, personal writings, testimonies of 
contemporaries and, crucial to this enquiry, the subject’s work may all be taken into 
account. In order to sift through the potentially inexhaustible supply of such 
biographical information, when taken in the context mentioned above, Schultz has 
provided a set of basic diagnostic criteria for assessing its pertinence and relevance. 
Since it would be foolish to generalise too much about this, precisely how and why 
these criteria are going to be used in this thesis is better left to the practical examples 
contained in Part Two, where a reproduction of those criteria may also be found. 
 On that note, the central process of psychobiographical investigation occurs 
when the theory, which as mentioned above is an amalgamation of other theories 
chosen from the above fields as appropriate to the subject or the nature of the 
enquiry, is applied to this previously selected pertinent biographical data. This theory 
is used as a lens through which to scrutinize the evidence presented, and the 
conclusions drawn by the psychobiographer result from the pursuit of (and, 
hopefully, elucidation of) a deeper understanding of the subject in question: the 
person. This is, in essence, what psychobiography is. 
 Generally, psychobiographical investigations employ the products of a 
person’s creativity as an ancillary device to ‘the understanding of persons’. However, 
there is an implied duality here, since psychobiography deems a person to be 
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comprised of both interior and exterior characteristics. Assuming that composers are 
not the exclusive remit of critical musicologists, but instead could also be of interest 
to psychobiographers, the practice of psychobiography can be said to posit a 
simultaneous relationship between the life and the (musical) work. Indeed, this thesis 
differs subtly from usual psychobiography by explicitly regarding the life and the 
work to be of equal importance. Where psychobiography is preoccupied with the 
person, I am preoccupied with both the person and the product/s of their creativity, 
although there are a number of notable examples where psychobiographical enquiry 
does focus explicitly on a subject’s art – one of which is discussed later in this 
section. 
According to Schultz, psychobiographical enquiry should ideally be based on 
a wealth of biographical material. Once a subject has been settled on, the ‘mound of 
biographical, psychological, and literary data’50 must be carefully sifted through, and 
the psychobiographer should select episodes or events of unique ‘saliency’. This may 
be accomplished purely intuitively at this stage, but Schultz does provide guidelines 
on how this might be systematically achieved, which are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four. The final stage is then to cogently interpret the selected data. 
While informing us what constitutes an effective and thought provoking 
psychobiography, Schultz also highlights what makes a bad one (see Table 1 below). 
Of particular note is the first entry on pathography, which, as we will see, becomes 
an important point of discussion in Chapter Four. 
 
                                                            
50 Schultz, ‘How to Strike Psychological Pay Dirt’, 42. 
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Table 1 ‘Bad psychobiography markers’51 
 
 
To reiterate, this thesis posits the notion that a person should not necessarily 
be divorced from their public act, or vice versa – in the same way that the supposedly 
autonomous musical work should not be divorced from its worldly context (‘public 
act’ in this instance refers to the subject’s work). A person may, consciously or not, 
imprint themselves in some (not necessarily all) of the work they create. I say not 
necessarily all, despite the seemingly redundant question ‘can a work not reflect its 
creator?’ This must be demonstrated as persuasively as possible, at least since it 
cannot necessarily be empirically proven. Therefore, to better understand the person 
on a psychological/psychoanalytical level may well illuminate hidden or latent 
meaning contained within their work. This notion works both ways: some factor 
present in their work may help explain the person in more detail. In this sense, 
psychobiography is about ‘mystery’s elucidation’ – that is, what seems 
incomprehensible or unexplained in either the life or the work.52 It must be stated at 
this point that psychobiography does not claim to be able to understand or focus on 
the entirety of a person or their oeuvre. As Schultz asserts ‘[psychobiography] most 
often targets one facet of a life at a time, a more or less discrete episode or event or 
action, not “the” life in all its yawning immensity’.53 
Schultz provides many examples of how psychobiography may work in this 
manner. In a brief discussion of Kathryn Harrison’s The Seal Wife (2003), Schultz 
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observes that Harrison 
devotes a page or two to, of all things, an eerily ambulatory 
tongue – sneaking up on the book’s main character, twisting 
and turning wetly. Lacking context, the image jars. It seems, 
at first, inexplicable, incongruous. Then one recalls 
Harrison’s affair with her father (which she describes in her 
memoir, The Kiss 1997), and how that affair commenced 
with a ‘French kiss’. At once the tongue makes sense. Its 
return in fiction coheres with the life. Superimposing one on 
the other – the life on the art – resolves perplexity.54 
This is a rather extreme example, and rather simple in comparison with others in its 
conclusion, but it does serve to illustrate the broader point that biographical meaning 
a) can be latently encoded in a work, b) can be deciphered, c) can be observed from 
the domain of and understood through the lens of a subject’s creative work, d) that, 
in this instance, life and art are inextricably linked and e) that in pairing the two 
allegedly separate areas together, a discovery of meaning or increase of meaning can 
occur – both in terms of the work and the person. 
 Schultz’s analysis of Harrison’s The Seal Wife serves to demonstrate by 
means of example that there can exist legitimate links between a person’s life and 
their public acts (in Harrison’s case, publications), at least as far as psychobiography 
is concerned. In terms of transferring this legitimacy to critical musicology, the 
problem centres not just around the fact that music is a different medium to language, 
but also around the widely-held idea that a subject’s life is distinct and unrelated to 
their art or any other product of their creativity, and vice versa. The origins of this 
can be traced back as far as the concept of ‘absolute’ music, a premise which began 
in the nineteenth century with E. T. A. Hoffman’s writings on Beethoven, and one 
that has only relatively recently come under critical scrutiny. Absolute music is a 
term used variously to describe a musical work’s inability to express anything other 
than itself – its cultural transcendence in terms of it being divorced from its worldly 
context – and, by implication, the work’s impenetrability to musicological diagnostic 
and interpretive tools and methods. I use the word impenetrability, in the sense of a 
musical work being impenetrable to extra-musical consideration or connotation. 
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Analysts of a Schenkerian persuasion, for example, would argue that a musical work 
is penetrable by analysis of its formal/structural musical contents (its inhalt: inter- 
and intra-musical contents). To this end, a whole branch of musicology (analysis) 
exists to uphold the idea of self-sufficient, autonomous music simply by explaining it 
purely in those terms and traditionally denying the possibility of any other way of 
explaining it: in other words, the autonomous musical work is entirely self-sufficient. 
I would argue, in terms of musicological endeavour, that this notion of self-
sufficiency was perpetuated and reinforced most forcefully by the countless 
structuralist, formalist analyses that began to emerge in the critic Eduard Hanslick’s 
day, who thought of music in terms of sonically moving forms, which sought to 
elucidate the formal coherence of a musical work for its own sake, in the process 
reinforcing the idea that the musical work is an hermetically-sealed entity. 
 Formalist analysis is a self-fulfilling prophecy, for its outcomes give reason to 
its practice, and examples of musicological work in this vein continue to appear to 
this day. The Journal of Music Theory, for example, proclaims itself ‘true to its 
original formalist outlook’, while more recently allowing for ‘the influences of 
philosophy, mathematics, computer science, cognitive sciences, and anthropology on 
music theory’.55 It was this self-fulfilling aspect of formalist analysis that Kerman 
reacted against in ‘How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out’. 
In sum, musico-psychobiography – like critical musicology – offers an 
alternative to empirical and dogmatic forms of interpretation, and will serve as the 
vehicle by which we can achieve our goal in Part Two of practically demonstrating a 
link between the life and the work. I have shown in this chapter that music-
psychobiography is in line with the precepts of critical musicology, and offers more 
reliable and concrete biographical insight into a composer’s musical works than 
traditional biography. 
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3 
Exegeses: positions and 
counterpositions 
 
 
Preamble 
 
As we saw in Chapter One, traditional musicology perpetually rejected biographical 
insight; the discussions below now take as a more detailed focus the central 
ideological constraints that persist in contemporary musicology. My purpose is not to 
refute these ideologies, but to propose and explore counterpositions to the 
philosophical and theoretical constraints they describe. Having examined them, and 
their implications for musico-psychobiography, it will then be possible to embark on 
a practical demonstration of musico-psychobiography in the form of a case study of 
composer Maurice Ravel and his opera L’Enfant et les Sortilèges. 
 
 
Authorial intentionality and theories of 
reception 
 
Authorial intentionality is the collective term used to describe a nexus of thought 
concerning the author, the author’s intention (in/for their work), and the work itself. 
There exists a number of elaborate and diverse hypotheses designed to delineate the 
philosophical precepts behind what we mean when we refer to an author, how we 
define a work, how an author and their work are related (if they are related at all) and 
what comprises the idea of the author’s intention. The author’s intention may, for 
example, be comprised of either conscious or unconscious inclusions of meaning in 
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their work; equally, it may be taken to refer to the author’s privileged knowledge of 
the ‘true’ meaning of their work. This latter definition is the most significant since it 
implies that the author has privileged access to the ‘correct’ interpretation of their 
work. In this section, we will see why this idea is so significant and how it has been 
challenged. 
 The effects on criticism of the concept of authorial intentionality is 
represented in a substantial body of literature spanning the period from the 
nineteenth century to the present day. However, reactions to the concept are perhaps 
best exemplified in mid-twentieth-century French post-structuralist discourse, whose 
influence became an instrumental factor in situating issues of authorial intentionality 
high on the agenda of contemporary criticism. Therefore, this section takes as its 
focus a discussion of two of the most influential French post-structuralist works on 
the subject of authorial intentionality: Roland Barthes’s ‘The Death of the Author’ 
(1967) and Michel Foucault’s ‘What is an Author?’ (1969). 
 The vast majority of critical opprobrium levelled at the concept of authorial 
intentionality has resulted from a perception that criticism’s historical preoccupation 
with the author has allowed him/her to ‘hold a monopoly over the signification of 
their work’.56 The constraints thus imposed on interpretations of, for example, 
literary texts have given rise to a number of alternative modes of criticism that have 
sought to transpose the principle of subjectivity from the domain of the author into 
that of the receiver of the work – the connection with reception theory could not be 
clearer, and this is discussed in greater detail later in this section. 
 This transposition of the subject is, however, in contrast to Foucault’s 
objectives, which seek to do away with subjectivity almost altogether through its 
subordination to the formal structures of language, and this in turn is contrasted 
against Barthes’s intention to liberate criticism while preserving at least some 
semblance of subjectivity. Technical differences in their reasoning aside, Barthes and 
Foucault’s disquisitions share a common goal: to dethrone the author and his/her 
direct and/or indirect power over the signification of their work/s (although, perhaps 
Foucault comes closer to this mark than Barthes). The specifics of their arguments, 
as examined below, pose challenges to psychobiography that are addressed later, and 
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will serve to illuminate some of the issues propounded by the methodology of this 
thesis. 
 
 
‘The Death of the Author’ 
 
Roland Barthes’s seminal essay, ‘The Death of the Author’, is perhaps the most 
widely familiar (and most concise) critique of the concept of authorial intentionality. 
Barthes’s essay, for example, credits a number of authors who shared his desire to 
depose the author. In addition, ‘The Death of the Author’ credits the entirety of the 
Surrealist movement as having 
contributed to the desacrilisation [sic] of the image of the 
Author by ceaselessly recommending the abrupt 
disappointment of expectations of meaning ... by entrusting 
the hand with the task of writing as quickly as possible what 
the head itself is unaware of ... by accepting the principle and 
the experience of several people writing together.57 
Barthes’s essay represents one of many twentieth-century French post-structuralist 
arguments against traditional literary criticism’s practice of considering both the 
intentions and biographical context of the author in interpretations of their work. 
Foucault and Derrida, both French post-structuralists, have also published a number 
of such works either explicitly dedicated to or in the spirit of authorial deposition. 
There too have been various approaches to this end by many other schools of literary 
criticism in the wake of the Second World War; as identified by Samson, these 
include but are not limited to German Reception Theory, American New Criticism, 
Reader-Response Criticism and, as mentioned above, French post-structuralism.58 
Reception theory in particular has become a very important factor within critical 
musicology. Interpretation in terms of reception theory is seen as a way of explaining 
how musical works may be understood by listeners/recipients rather than as a means 
of explaining the work itself. This conceptualisation of a work’s meaning relates 
closely to Barthes’s proposal, but this idea will be discussed in greater detail later. 
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Samson suggests that despite their differences of approach these anti-
authorial arguments are united by their desire to ‘challenge an assumption that had 
often been implicit in earlier criticism, namely that authors might hold a monopoly 
over the signification of their work’.59 Barthes’s statement to this effect is as follows: 
The image of literature to be found in ordinary culture is 
tyrannically centred on the author, his person, his life, his 
tastes, his passions, while criticism still consists for the most 
part in saying that Baudelaire’s work is the failure of 
Baudelaire the man, Van Gogh’s his madness, Tchaikovsky’s 
his vice. The explanation of a work is always sought in the 
man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the 
end ... the voice of a single person, the author confiding in 
us.60 
Barthes argues that the author is a regrettable product of society’s discovery of the 
‘prestige of the individual’ 61  and that his or her image has been deified by 
contemporary culture and criticism to the point of perverting the meaning of the 
work itself. In an attempt to highlight this, Barthes even goes so far as to capitalise 
every instance of the word ‘author’ throughout his essay, in the manner in which one 
would traditionally refer to the name of a deity. Contending that such obsessive focus 
on the author imposes a limit on the reader’s ability to interpret the text, ‘furnish[ing] 
it with a final signified ... clos[ing] the writing’,62 Barthes concludes his essay by 
asserting that ‘the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author’,63 
in no uncertain terms aligning himself with the desire to escape the perceived 
monopoly of the author over their work’s interpretation. 
 How Barthes attempts this is worth exploring. In order to displace the 
perceived limiting control of the author over the interpreter’s reading of their text, 
which he defines as ‘the message of the Author-God’, Barthes instead posits a figure 
whom he calls ‘the scriptor’, whose writing is ‘made of multiple writings, drawn 
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from many cultures and entering into mutual relations of dialogue, parody, 
contestation’, and that ‘[the] one place where this multiplicity is focused ... is the 
reader, not, as was hitherto said, the author’.64 The inability of the scriptor to express 
him or herself without recourse to intertextuality, whose authorial presence in the 
work can be and is nothing more than a first-person, present-tense linguistic 
enunciation I, and who has neither past nor identity, leads inescapably to the notion 
that the author’s intention (and their biographical context) whether or not 
consciously or unconsciously included in the work, is rendered both irrelevant and 
inconsequential to interpretations of their works. Indeed, the scriptor has no worldly 
context. 
 Barthes’s mention of the ‘prestige of the individual’ is a central theme in both 
structuralist and post-structuralist thought. According to Madan Sarup, ‘Lévi-Strauss, 
a leading structuralist, called the human subject ... the “spoilt brat of philosophy”. 
[Lévi-Strauss] stated that the ultimate goal of the human sciences is not to constitute 
man but to dissolve him. This became the slogan of structuralism’.65 He also goes on 
to note that ‘the post-structuralists ... also want to dissolve the subject’,66 but perhaps 
none quite as polemically as Foucault. 
 
 
‘What is an Author?’ 
 
Michel Foucault develops the themes presented in Barthes’s argument in his essay 
‘What is an Author?’ and perhaps better exemplifies the issues at work as a result of 
his extensive elaboration.67 Foucault’s theme is exemplified, he tells us, by Beckett’s 
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proclamation ‘What does it matter who is speaking?’ – he proposes, as had Barthes, 
that one of the fundamental ethical principles of writing in his time was defined by 
such an indifference towards notions of authorship (but he goes on to argue that 
although this principle has been taken up over and over again, it had never been fully 
applied).68 
 According to Gary Gutting’s assessment, Foucault’s concern in his writing 
was ‘to escape from any fixed identity, to continually become someone else, thereby 
never really being anyone’.69 Michael Zink describes literature in this vein as 
essentially formalist, ‘consisting of variations within a linguistic code and not the 
expression of subjectivity’.70 Gutting, speaking of the writing of Raymond Roussel 
(of whom Foucault was especially fond), observes that Roussel achieved his 
exclusion of subjectivity ‘because of the strong subordination to formal rules, the 
words written flow more from the impersonal structures of language itself than from 
Roussel’s thoughts and feelings’.71 
 Foucault’s obsession, then, was concerned with the removal of human 
subjectivity in discourse and its subordination to structural systems of language – a 
significantly more extreme stance than that taken by Barthes. This apparent 
connection to musical formalism as explored in the previous section is strong 
(although, as John H. Bouchard notes, Foucault forcefully denied any perceived 
affinity of his to such formalist modes of thought).72 
 Foucault’s essay, like Barthes’s, is in part reacting against the existence of a 
perceived ‘fundamental critical category of the man and his work’,73 and he argues 
instead that 
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the task of criticism is not to re-establish the ties between an 
author and his work or to reconstitute an author’s thought and 
experience through his works and, further, that criticism 
should concern itself with the structures of a work, its 
architectonic forms, which are studied for their intrinsic and 
internal relationships.74 
Indeed, Zink corroborates Foucault’s assertion: writing in 1985 (bearing in mind that 
Foucault was writing in 1969), he notes that 
at the present time, examining literary expression[s] of the 
subject by itself is almost an act of provocation.... 
‘Immanent’ criticism has for several decades insisted on 
denying any referent to the text, showing that language 
functions according to its intrinsic structural laws in a closed 
circuit and refers to itself alone, casting doubt on the very 
concept of the author.75 
It is interesting to note the connection between Zink’s comments on literary criticism 
and the post-Kerman ‘new’ musicologies emerging after 1980: Zink’s description of 
the function of language solely in terms of its self-referential and intrinsic structural 
hierarchies is strikingly similar to the formalist enquiries in musicology that sought 
to explain music in terms of its absolute formal self-sufficiency (which Kerman was, 
of course, reacting against). 
 Foucault begins his argument by interrogating some of our most basic 
assumptions about the author. He begins with a brief historical contextualisation of 
the notion of an author, and moves on to a discussion of the problems inherent in our 
definition of what an author is, what s/he does, the qualities with which we accord 
them, and the implications of such commonplace assumptions – a level of detail not 
provided by Barthes. 
 First, Foucault argues that our conception of the ‘solid and fundamental role 
of an author and his works’76 that we take as a given is in fact the result of ‘a 
privileged moment of individualisation [read: subjectivisation] in the history of 
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ideas, knowledge, and literature, or in the history of philosophy and sciences’.77 We 
can compare this to Barthes’s earlier contention that the author is a regrettable 
product of society’s discovery of the ‘prestige of the individual’. Foucault adds that, 
as a result, these historical modes of discourse appear to pale into insignificance in 
comparison to discussions of the author. 
 In addressing our tendency to view the concept of authorship as a solid and 
fundamental construction, Foucault also questions (and castigates) our tendency to 
conceive of authors as individuals somehow isolated from the rest of society – as 
figures who somehow seem to transcend the cultural history to which they belong. 
We may infer a connection here to the nineteenth-century Romantic ‘cult of the 
genius’ described in the first chapter by Maynard Solomon as being a potential factor 
in musicology’s lack of attention to biography. In addition, Gutting explains that the 
Romantic relationship between text and language 
sees the author as straining against the structures of language 
to express unique individual insights. Foucault, however, is ... 
interested in another mode in which authors can relate to 
language, one in which the point is not to use language for 
self-expression but to lose the self in language.78 
Therefore, in my reading of ‘What is an Author?’, Foucault seems to resist both the 
idea of the author as a privileged individual, capable of transcending history and thus 
reinforcing the author’s solidity and fundamentality, and the accompanying 
Romantic idea of self-expression and subjectivisation gained through a heroic 
struggle to overcome language. Foucault’s resistance to these ideas also seems to 
constitute his issues with écriture – one of various systems ‘destined to replace the 
privileged position accorded to the author ... [which] merely served to attest the 
possibility of genuine change’.79 
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 Foucault went on to propose the ‘author-function’ as an alternative. The 
author-function, in contrast to the author, describes a role that fulfils a socially and 
culturally constructed relationship to the text – it is a function of discourse. This 
societally and culturally described function is connected to theories of reception, 
which are addressed later in this section. Foucault arrives at this position after having 
explicated a number of issues implicit in traditional conceptions of the author. 
Foucault first raises the issue of how we define a work, asking what kinds of text 
constitute an author’s work through the example of Nietzsche. In the case of 
Nietzsche, he left behind drafts, deleted passages, notes, aphorisms, even the details 
of meetings, addresses, and laundry lists. Foucault entreats us to ask: ‘How can one 
define a work amid the millions of traces left by someone after his death?’.80 
 Therefore, defining the author as one who is the originator of a text is 
misleading insofar as only certain kinds of text constitute the author’s work. As 
Foucault states, ‘If some have found it convenient to bypass the individuality of the 
writer or his status as an author to concentrate on a work, they have failed to 
appreciate the equally problematic nature of the word “work” and the unity of the 
work and the author it designates.’81 In other words, it is not enough to simply do 
without the writer (or author) and study the work itself. As Gutting notes, ‘being an 
author is not ... just a matter of being the literal ‘cause’ (producer) of a certain kind 
of text. It is instead a matter of being judged responsible for the text’.82 This last 
point underpins one of the central ideas of the author-function. 
Foucault began his essay by questioning our tendency to imagine authors as 
individuals isolated from the rest of society. In positing the social construction of the 
author function as defined above, Foucault anticipates some of the concerns of 
reception theory. As he opines, ‘[p]erhaps the time has come to study not only the 
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expressive value and formal transformations of discourse, but its mode of existence: 
the modifications and variations, within any culture, of modes of circulation, 
valorisation, attribution, and appropriation’.83 
Foucault argued near his conclusion that the author is not a source of infinite 
meaning, as we often like to imagine, but rather part of a larger system of beliefs that 
serve to limit and restrict meaning: to limit, for example, what someone might say 
about a text, or to mark some interpretations and commentaries as illegitimate. This 
links directly to Stanley Fish and his ideas of ‘The Authority of Interpretive 
Communities’, which will be addressed in the next section on reception theory. 
 
 
Theories of reception 
 
The term reception theory, whether applied to literary or musical criticism, denotes 
an interpretive approach that takes as its focus the reader instead of the author. In Jim 
Samson’s definition, reception is ‘a term applied both to the history of social 
responses to art, and to an aesthetic that privileges those responses.’84 In other words, 
reception history is a form of art criticism that takes as its central interpretive 
parameter both the individual and the societal reception of works (although the 
simultaneous consideration of both individual and societal responses to works has 
been a contentious issue in reception theory, as I will explain); reception aesthetics 
may refer to the philosophical implications and arguments that underpin its 
methodological processes. In any case, reception theories privilege the nature of a 
work’s reception over time by its recipients as the determining factor of a work’s 
cultural identity, aesthetic value and meaning. 
Widespread interest in theories of reception was promulgated first in German 
literary criticism through the work of Hans Robert Jauss, whose rezeptionsästhetik 
developed between the late 1960s and early 1970s.85 Jenny Doctor explains that 
Jauss developed his rezeptionsästhetik in response to his sense of disillusionment 
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with traditional approaches to literary criticism. These approaches were characterised 
by the consideration of work’s meaning in regard to its position within a 
chronological series, Marxist and formalist techniques of interpretation, and 
‘sociological, psychoanalytical, semasiological, gestalt-psychological, or 
aesthetically oriented methods’.86 Jauss instead proposed an approach in which the 
origins of a work and the development of responses to it over time are key to 
understanding its identity,87concluding, in Holub’s words, that ‘literature should be 
treated as a dialectical process of production and reception’.88 This approach is 
equally applicable to musical works, as is the question of the location of a work’s 
meaning. The latter point presents perhaps the most crucial complexity of reception 
theory that impacts on the psychobiographical methodology of this thesis. 
Jauss’s theory maintains that the meaning of a work is not inherently posited 
during its creation (i.e. by its author) but is gained instead through the cumulative 
effect of its subsequent reception – he privileges the reader as ‘the addressee for 
whom the … work is primarily destined’. In focusing on the reader (and therefore 
downplaying the effect that the content of the work and its creator have on its 
meaning), the responses of both the individual and the effects of a broader 
accumulation of taste and understanding become central to Jauss’s formulation of 
interpretation. These developments bear significant ramifications to our discussion of 
the author, which we will come to in Part Two of this thesis. 
Jauss proposes that the relationship between a work and its reader is a 
continuous dynamic process encompassing the work in question and both previous 
and subsequent works. Jauss explains that this process over time decides the 
historical significance of a work and its aesthetic value, since the reader compares 
the work’s aesthetic value against those already experienced and this initial reception 
is transmitted in a chain of receptions from generation to generation. Therefore a 
work’s identity and significance varies over time and any historical discussion of a 
work must acknowledge this fluidity. Here, Jauss draws on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
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notion of a ‘horizon of expectations’ in order to describe the prevailing taste of 
society as a whole at any given time in a work’s history. 
Wolfgang Iser, a German literary scholar and colleague of Jauss’s at the 
University of Konstanz, further developed the reader-orientated approach to literary 
criticism by examining, ‘how the “implied reader” engages in gap-filling and image-
making strategies as he or she produces meaning from a necessarily indeterminate 
text’, a text which includes, ‘“unwritten” as well as written parts.’89 Iser’s contention 
is therefore that the reader’s interpretation is in part responsible for creating the 
meaning in a text at the points where the text appears indeterminate. 
While Samson notes that traditional musicology had attempted to generalise 
about audiences’ awareness of and attitudes towards particular repertories long 
before the term reception came about (and in so doing attempted to illuminate 
music’s functions within society),90 reception theory was ‘registered by musicology 
from the late 1960s onwards … in the work of scholars with a leaning towards the 
sociology of music, notably Hans Eggebrecht, Zofia Lissa and Tibor Kneif.’91 With 
the gradual emergence of new musicologies in British and American scholarship 
during the 1970s and 1980s, whose goal was to undermine notions of musical 
autonomy, reception studies offered one possible route to this objective. However, 
this uptake was not without problematic implications for musical interpretation. 
Samson states that ‘perhaps the most problematical dimension of a reception 
aesthetics concerns the stability of the work as a text.’ In other words, if the 
mechanism of reception requires the recipient to determine the nature of the text, or 
the text to depend on what s/he receives, then the text itself becomes unstable, as 
does interpretation of that text. 
Stanley Fish’s Is There a Text in This Class argues that the reader’s 
interpretation is responsible for the production of literature because they are 
responsible for determining the conventions by which a work of literature is defined 
(compare Foucault’s comments on how we define a work). Fish speaks of the ‘power 
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of an interpretive community’92 which defines literature and what are considered to 
be correct or incorrect interpretations. He suggests 
[G]iven the notion of interpretive communities, agreement 
more or less explained itself: members of the same 
community will necessarily agree because they will see (and 
by seeing, make) everything in relation to that community’s 
assumed purposes and goals; and conversely, members of 
different communities will disagree because from each of 
their respective positions the other ‘simply’ cannot see what 
is obviously and inescapably there.93 
Samson’s comments in relation to musicology are closely linked to Fish’s argument 
that our interpretations are, in effect, responsible for the texts they interpret, 
describing this process as a construction of the object of our enquiry: 
it is difficult to deny that a reception aesthetics highlights the 
relativity – the perspectival quality – of our analytical 
knowledge. Through our encounter with other historical 
subjects, we are constantly made aware that we ourselves 
construct the object of our enquiry, and that we do so within 
the terms of a particular horizon of expectation.94 
 
 
Implications for musico-psychobiography 
 
As we have seen, both Barthes and Foucault’s objectives in their respective essays 
have been to depose the author – indeed, both came to the same conclusions 
concerning the death of the author, or as Gutting puts it, ‘the death of the conception 
of the author as self-expressive’.95 Where Barthes posits the notion of the scriptor as 
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an alternative figure, Foucault posits the author-function. Both Barthes’s and 
Foucault’s essays are written from a position of the writing in vogue of their day, 
where authors such as Stéphane Mallarmé, Paul Valéry and Marcel Proust, and their 
attempts to distance themselves from their texts, were widely read.96 Accordingly, 
neither Barthes nor Foucault argue the untenable points that authors do not exist, or 
that the work of an author is or has always been devoid of the subjective imprints of 
their originators; rather, since their arguments centre around the work of their time, 
they collectively call for a discourse and criticism in which this can be made to be 
the case. All this, of course, occurred in reaction to the aforementioned limiting 
control over meaning accorded by an author-centric ideology. 
Reception theory, on the other hand, is somewhat different. It concerns itself 
not so much with abolishing notions of subjectivity as with the investigation of 
individual and intersubjective responses to texts – as Fish put it, ‘interpretation is the 
source of texts, facts, authors, and intentions’.97 Nonetheless, theories of reception 
still involve a move away from the author and the idea of a stable primary meaning 
fixed at the point of origin by the creator. 
 Neither Barthes’s nor Foucault’s essays require refutation in order for us to 
move beyond their mode of thought – a thought concerned with the excision of the 
author from criticism – since this was an appropriate feature of the cultural and 
historical milieu to which they belonged. Similarly, we need not attempt to discredit 
theories of reception, which also shift interpretive considerations of the essential 
meaning of works away from the author and instead towards the reader. The strains 
of interpretive thought described by these methodologies are connected by their 
shared objective of questioning the originating point of meaning within works, and 
by their emphasis on denying the possibility of a fixed, singular meaning, which 
appears to result from the author. Instead of refuting their methodologies, it is 
necessary only to argue that the perception that criticism’s historical preoccupation 
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with the author has allowed him/her to ‘hold a monopoly over the signification of 
their work’98 need no longer prevail. 
It is unnecessary to defend musico-psychobiography in the face of 
poststructuralist or reception theory, precisely because post-structuralism and 
reception theory brought about such fundamental change: as we have seen, the act of 
interpretation is now generally recognised as a creative act that generates meaning. 
The author-God is, in effect, deposed. It is important to note that my 
psychobiographical methodology does not seek to uncover a single theological 
meaning in this sense: instead it takes the author as one important element in the 
generation of a creative but rigorous and plausible interpretation. 
However, psychobiography is not yet recognised by the ‘authority of the 
musicological community’, to adapt the subtitle to Fish’s aforementioned book. It is 
a methodology that is gaining recognition within other fields outside of psychology 
(for example, in literature and literary criticism) but it has yet to make an impact 
within musicology. This thesis will show that it can serve musicological inquiry well, 
and that it need not be regarded as a return to old-fashioned means of interpretation. 
True, it completely defines its focus on what Barthes earlier called the ‘prestige of 
the individual’; in Schultz’s words, psychobiography ‘adopt[s] the individual as a 
primary unit of analysis’.99 Psychobiography is of the view that authors’ works are 
generally created in order to express something of vital personal importance, and 
therefore that an author’s motives – whether conscious or unconscious – are 
inherently meaningful and that this meaning pertains to both the author and their 
work/s. Both author and work are considered to be mutually informative and not, as 
any of the French post-structuralists who purport the meaninglessness of the author 
would have it, mutually exclusive. However, as I explained in Chapter Two, musico-
psychobiography does not claim that meaning is exclusively implanted in the work 
by its author, and that its uncovering with interpretive focus purely on the author will 
result in the elucidation of a singular truth. In other words, musico-psychobiography 
is not the only way to interpret a work’s meaning, but one possible way. Focus on the 
author is no longer the traditional source of all truth in the meaning of a work, but as 
I will demonstrate in Part Two, a source of further meaningful information. Meaning 
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can also be seen to reside in how this information is interpreted, and in that sense 
musico-psychobiography is not at odds with reception theory or the concept of the 
creative (or, for that matter, Iser’s ‘implied’) reader. 
 
 
Projective identification 
 
While not necessarily central to all psychobiographical investigations, the concept of 
projective identification is relevant to the practical application of musico-
psychobiography in Part Two. As Alan C. Elms has illustrated, since 
psychobiography involves the scientific component of applied psychological or 
psychoanalytical theories, specific theories must be chosen in relation to the 
psychobiographical subject being addressed.100 I would argue that the theory of 
projective identification can yield significant interpretive insights into Ravel’s 
L’Enfant et les sortilèges and, in specific relation to Nicky Losseff’s reformulation of 
the concept to musical scenarios, it carries with it wider implications for the 
psychobiographical methodology I have outlined. Therefore, projective identification 
merits a separate discussion here. In this section, I will examine Losseff’s 
reformulation of the concept to apply to the musical scenario of the 
performer/interpreter and the musical work and use it as a basis on which to posit my 
own formulation, which will describe the process of projective identification 
between a composer and their work. 
 
 
Psychodynamic definitions 
 
Projective identification typically describes a psychodynamic process of 
psychological interaction between two people. This process may be unconscious to 
both parties, or unconscious to one and conscious to the other. In this section I will 
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distinguish between these parties as the ‘subject’ and the ‘object’ of projective 
identification. 
Barbara O’Connell explains that, 
Projective identification is an infiltration of the mind and 
body…. When we allow ourselves to be receptive to another 
person, we have the capacity to resonate with the 
unconscious feelings of that person like a vibrating tuning 
fork. And when we resonate with those feelings, our whole 
being is involved.101 
In psychoanalytic discourse, this ‘infiltration’ is said to permeate throughout the 
mind and body of the external object, and it is the other party – the perpetrator of the 
infiltration – who is the subject. The process by which this infiltration occurs is 
‘projection’, and the ‘resonation of the whole being’ to which O’Connell refers is the 
‘identification’ component in the process. O’Connell’s mention of a bodily 
involvement in this process is important, as we will discover later. 
The process is thought to emanate from the primitive defence mechanism of 
the ego – Losseff indeed notes that both projection and identification are classical 
Freudian mechanisms of defence102 – in which parts of the subject’s internal self are 
split off from and forced into an external human object. The external object thus 
becomes ‘a container outside of oneself which will hold and manage … unwanted 
feelings [or parts of the self]’.103 This is what Anthony Storr refers to as the fantasy 
of a person ‘imagin[ing] himself to be inside some object external to himself’.104 
The external object then ‘resonates’ with the projected parts of the subject’s 
internal self. The object’s resonation with these projections gives rise to behaviours 
in response to them, such that the object then appears to behave as if the projections 
were true – they are now perceived as real and grounded in reality by the subject. As 
Losseff explains, ‘the attributes of the projected thoughts, feelings and beliefs [i.e. 
                                                            
101 O’Connell, ‘Understanding Projective Identification in Psychotherapy’, (accessed 
12 June 2011). No page numbers supplied. 
102 Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 53. 
103 O’Connell, ‘Understanding Projective Identification in Psychotherapy’, (accessed 
12 June 2011). 
104 Storr, Music and the Mind, 106.
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parts of the self] do not reside solely within the subject, but instead are actually taken 
on by the external object’.105 This may occur in the clinical setting, according to 
O’Connell, when 
the projector, with a certain attitude and behaviour, exerts 
unconscious pressure on the therapist to accept and identify 
with the projections and has a fantasy of inhabiting not only 
the mind but also the body and emotions of the receiver.106 
In essence, the external object appears to the subject to have become the embodiment 
(literally and figuratively) of what has been projected. The subject hence identifies 
the external object with their projections, and the external object may too identify 
themselves with these projections. 
Nancy McWilliams has thus described the process of projective identification 
as a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’,107 which distinguishes the concept from projection 
alone since the subject’s engagement with projection induces in the external object 
behaviours that the subject already believes to be true. O’Connell explains how this 
feature of projective identification appears in the context of the clinical setting: 
projective identification can be seen as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy in terms of the projector whereby [they] may 
believe something about [their] therapist which isn’t entirely 
true but, by the process of relating to [them] as if it were, the 
therapist may succumb and identify with them in a process 
                                                            
105 Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 53–54. 
106 This is not, however, true in every case of projective identification in clinical 
scenarios, as it can be made to occur consciously and therapeutically, without the 
need for the manipulation and coercion of the therapist. O’Connell, 
‘Understanding Projective Identification in Psychotherapy’, (accessed 12 June 
2011). 
107 McWilliams, Psychoanalytic Diagnosis: Understanding Personality Structure in 
the Clinical Process, 111. Also quoted in Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, 
Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 54. 
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called introjective identification, thus altering their usual 
behaviour to make it true.108 
Projective identification may occur as a form of communication when it is ‘a mutual 
process in which projector and recipient interact with one another at an unconscious 
level’,109 or as a form of psychic defence (as mentioned above) when the subject 
experiences parts of the self that are inaccessible, unwanted, or unbearable. For 
Greatrex, this may be understood in terms of a ‘point of intersection between the 
seemingly impenetrable bulwark built against intolerable psychic pain and attempts 
at communication that can penetrate such a barrier’.110 By projecting parts of the self 
into an external object, the subject can feel in control of both those projected parts 
and the external object which has become identified with them: on this latter point, 
Losseff agrees that ‘projection into an external object allows the subject control over 
the object’.111 This idea of the subject’s control over the object is discussed in a 
practical scenario in the concluding section to Chapter Five, but it is also significant 
when we come to talk about Losseff’s reformulation of the concept to a musical 
scenario. 
In the clinical setting, O’Connell states that the process involves feelings 
‘being evacuated from the client into the therapist…. By defensively inducing the 
projected experience, whatever it is, in another one is more able to avoid the reality 
that the projected content is part of one’s own experience’. 112  Projective 
identification is therefore a crucial therapeutic strategy in clinical psychoanalysis – 
                                                            
108 O’Connell, ‘Understanding Projective Identification in Psychotherapy’, (accessed 
12 June 2011). 
109 Bateman and Holmes, Introduction to Psychoanalysis: Contemporary Theory and 
Practice, 85. 
110 Greatrex, ‘Projective Identification: How does it Work?’, 187–188. 
111 Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 54. 
112 O’Connell, ‘Understanding Projective Identification in Psychotherapy’, (accessed 
12 June 2011). 
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according to Wilfred Bion, projective identification is the single most important 
phenomenon in individual psychotherapy.113 
 
 
‘Projective Identification, Musical Interpretation and 
the Self’ 
 
Nicky Losseff’s article argues that projective identification might be reformulated to 
describe the dynamics of interaction between a musical work and its interpreter. 
Aside from arguing that projective identification might help elucidate the complex 
relationship between a text and its reader, in her article she argues that the musical 
work can act on the interpreter in the same capacity as the analyst acts upon the 
analysand when projective identification occurs in a therapeutic form in the clinical 
setting: the musical work can become a container into which parts of the interpreter’s 
self are evacuated (Hanna Segal describes this as the ‘unconscious fantasy of … 
feelings being evacuated into the internal and external objects’114) and, as Wilfred 
Bion proposed,115 returned in a modified form. 
Projective identification may be said to comprise four key stages – I have 
summarised my interpretation of them below (see Table 2 below). Losseff notes that, 
for Storr, ‘a creative work possesses characteristics of the mind that created it and is 
thus in some sense both human and alive’, 116  and she states that ‘through 
interpreting, we essentially create objects of fantasy to which we bring a deep sense 
of self’.117 The creation of a fantasy object is said to occur since music does not 
operate in verbal language or in fixed meanings. 
                                                            
113 Thorpe, ‘A Phenomenological Investigation into the Psychotherapist’s Experience 
of Identifying, Containing and Processing the Patient’s Projective Identifications’, 
2. See also Ogden, Projective Identification & Psychotherapeutic Technique, 25. 
114 Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, 155–161. Emphasis added. 
115 See Grotstein, ‘Projective Transidentification: An Extension of the Concept of 
Projective Identification’, 168–189. 
116 Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 55. 
117 Ibid., 49. 
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Table 2 Key stages of projective identification 
1. Projection The subject projects parts of the self into the external 
object. 
2. Retention/Containment The external object retains the projected parts of the 
subject’s internal self. 
3. Perception/Embodiment The subject perceives the external object as having 
become characterised by the projected parts of the self. 
4. Modification/Reception The object processes the projected parts of the self in 
some way, and the subject receives them in a modified 
form. 
 
Furthermore, Losseff argues that 
it is precisely because pieces of music do not have to have 
concrete, definitive programmes that they are able to act as 
the objects for projective identification. In fact, it is only 
because meaning is created in objects by subjects that those 
objects can bear the weight of so much latitude in possible 
meaning.118 
Losseff makes a connection here between projective identification and reception 
theory, according to which the validity of the text is derived from the reading 
process, which allows subjects to connect texts with realities outside of those texts 
and, in doing so, to establish reciprocal relationships with their environments. In 
addition, this can be related to Wolfgang Iser’s ideas about the reader ‘concretising’ 
texts (filling in the gaps) such that the text-reader interaction becomes a form of 
communication, similar to the communicative form of projective identification I 
mentioned earlier. 
Implicit in Jonathan Kramer’s argument that music can act as a mirror of the 
mind, and that ‘challenging music, unusual music, may force us beyond ourselves … 
may help us to forge new selves’,119 are the ideas that musical works may reflect 
individual human psychologies, and that the interpreter of them must invest aspects 
                                                            
118 Ibid., 54. Losseff’s contention about definable programmatic elements in music 
becomes problematic when we come to discuss opera, as we shall see in the 
concluding section to Chapter Five. 
119 Kramer, ‘Foreword: a musician listens to a psychoanalyst listening to music’, xxi. 
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of the self in the interpretive process. In sum, it is this psychological investment of 
the self that comprises the first stage of projective identification. The second stage 
involves the evacuation of feelings into music and the possibility of believing that 
‘music is actually about those feelings’, as Losseff puts it. Losseff also notes that 
music can be a container for feelings.120 In relation to the third stage, as I have 
described it, Losseff argues that ‘interpreters develop a sense of ownership of pieces 
through the increasing levels of “understanding” what the music “means”’.121 In 
addition, Losseff posits a reciprocal relationship, in which ‘the interpreter may feel 
… that the music “understands” him or her, returning feelings in an altered, resolved 
form.’ This occurs since, having invested a sense of self, the music appears to 
resonate with the self, and we identify with it because it means what we think it 
means – it becomes the object of our own enquiry, a self-fulfilling fantasy. The 
fourth and final stage of projective identification requires the projected parts of the 
self to be modified in some way, and returned to their originator. Losseff argues that 
this can occur in her scenario since a musical work may present and modify its 
musical material to form a narrative which, certainly in the case of most tonal music, 
goes on to resolve: ‘because the tracts of music which interpreters identify with their 
feelings (and into which they have projected their feelings) eventually resolve, so 
might their feelings resolve with them’.122 
 
 
Reformulating: ‘Composer-as-subject’ 
 
Although Losseff concedes that musical interpretation can occur in various forms 
since we can engage meaningfully with a musical work in many ways (e.g. listening 
or analysis), her concern is primarily with the performer and the act of performance. 
Noting that performance is the only form of interpretation in which the interpretation 
finds a directly physical realisation, she explains this focus by arguing that 
only performers are in a position to actualise a process in 
which the musical external objects can take on new 
                                                            
120 Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 55–56. 
121 Ibid., 54. 
122 Ibid., 56. 
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characteristics. An imagined rendition of a listener would 
remain essentially private in that listener’s mind.123 
As we have seen, Losseff has been able to justifiably appropriate the process of 
projective identification to the scenario of the interpreter/performer-as-subject and 
the musical work-as-object. This is because the performer invests in the musical 
work a deep sense of self through interpretation and performance, and the musical 
work can demonstrably receive and return aspects of that invested sense of self to the 
performer from whom they originate in a modified form. As I have shown, these are 
two essential criteria that must be fulfilled in order for projective identification to 
theoretically occur. 
 Therefore, I hypothesise that the process of projective identification may be 
equally applicable to certain scenarios involving the composer/author-as-subject and 
the musical-work-as-object. In order for this hypothesis to function, it must be 
demonstrated that the musical work can still act as a container despite the absence of 
a physically performative interaction (and the associated bodily component Losseff 
identified) between subject and object. In addition, it must be demonstrated that the 
act of composition involves the investment of a deep sense of self into the musical 
work. On the face of things, this latter point appears to be a truism. However, as we 
have seen, the relationship between an author and their work is highly contentious 
and, as will be shown in more detail Part Two, the compositional relationship 
between a composer and their work can be even more complex: if the content of the 
musical work can contain a narrative of its composer’s self, then the composer’s self-
awareness of their act of composition becomes significant, as we will see in Chapter 
Four. I describe the music as containing and not becoming a narrative of the 
composer’s self since I am not arguing that the work’s totality of meaning is then 
reduced to a narrative of the composer’s psychological processes – nor am I 
suggesting that the composer is positing meaning directly through their work as a 
result of this process. In other words, the work may contain meanings in addition to 
aspects of its composer’s self, and both may be interpreted psychobiographically. 
After all, musico-psychobiography is intended to elucidate meaning in the work as 
much as in the composer, and to explore the dynamic interaction between the two. 
This will be demonstrated in the concluding section of Chapter Five. 
                                                            
123 Ibid., 53. 
 Part Two 
Practical Application 
 53 
4 
Maurice Ravel and L’Enfant et les 
sortilèges as case study subjects 
 
 
Ultimately, trying to pin Ravel down is about as futile as trying to 
catch [the demon] Scarbo in a bucket: he is always one step in front – 
or to the side.124 
 
Why the need for masks? In part, no doubt, because of his love of 
artefacts, musical objects and vehicles, but also because the Ravel 
who would be laid bare is such a private man – one who, both 
artistically and physically, exhibited unusual sensitivity and 
vulnerability, yet still had to endure a succession of traumas.125 
 
 
In order to demonstrate musico-psychobiography in action, I have selected the 
composer Maurice Ravel and his L’Enfant et les sortilèges – a one-act opera to a 
libretto by Colette, the first performance of which took place in Monte Carlo in 1925 
– as case study subjects. In this chapter, I will explain the psychobiographical 
justifications for having selected them, and I will identify key psychobiographical 
significances (or ‘saliencies’ as we will come to call them), which are subjected to a 
more detailed focus in the next chapter.  
                                                            
124 Nichols, Ravel, 356. Also quoted in Puri, review of Ravel, 619. 
125 Mawer, ‘Introduction’, 2. 
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Ravel as subject 
 
As I explained in Chapter Two, the selection of a psychobiographical subject should 
(at the very least) proceed on the basis that there is a wealth of biographical data 
available, and moreover that this data is of sufficient psychological pertinence to 
permit psychobiographical enquiry. On this latter point, almost any data may yield 
significance – particularly in the case of Ravel – and Schultz proposes as a result that 
one’s selection of relevant material may have to proceed on a trial-and-error basis. 
However, Schultz also points out that we may not have to engage with biographical 
material in such an unsystematic manner depending on the nature of the subject and 
that of the commentary that surrounds them: we will see that this is the case with 
Ravel and the themes that frequently surface in commentaries on his life and works. 
With Ravel, one would struggle to want for more biographical data, 
especially since musico-psychobiography hypothesises that the composer’s works 
may too yield biographical significance. A number of comprehensive biographies, 
widely representative collections of Ravel’s surviving letters and correspondences,126 
articles and reviews by the composer himself, testimonies and memoirs of his 
contemporaries in abundance, the composer’s works: all are readily accessible to the 
psychobiographer, and present them with a potential smorgasbord of biographical 
data through which to sift for significance. 
The significant data we seek must provide information on selected episodes 
or events of unique ‘saliency’ – of central importance in determining the outcomes of 
the life. This is especially important since psychobiography deals with the analysis of 
‘specificities’, as opposed to generalised totalities. However, the search for data may 
begin after a line of psychobiographical enquiry has been settled on. Schultz speaks 
of the koan – ‘a paradoxical, elusive phrase or episode requiring for its solution a 
leap to another level of understanding’127 – or core enchantment that initiates the 
psychobiographical line of enquiry: it describes the mystery or paradox we wish to 
elucidate in the life of the subject. 
                                                            
126 Unfortunately, however, when a telephone was installed at Ravel’s home, Le 
Bélvèdere, he all but ceased written communications. 
127 Schultz, ‘Introducing Psychobiography’, 8. 
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From the outset, we are made aware of the difficulty of such a task in the case 
of Ravel: commentary after commentary proclaims, as did an interviewer for De 
Telegraaf in 1931, ‘It is not easy to find the hiding place of Maurice Ravel’.128 
Indeed, Emile Vuillermoz, fellow ‘Apache’129 and founding member of the Société 
musicale indépendante, declared ‘everything about him proclaimed his distant 
origins’130 and Ricardo Viñes, a friend since childhood, stated that ‘Ravel is one of 
the most unlucky and misunderstood people of all…. He is, what’s more, very 
complex’.131 Part of this difficulty in locating the man behind the music results from 
Ravel’s intense privacy and personal discretion, his emotional detachment from his 
work and the peculiar sense of distance exhibited between the man and his music132 
which is embodied by salient features in his musical output (some of which we will 
focus on in Chapter Five). These features might be grouped under the concept of 
Ravel’s pudeur, or innate modesty, which Max Hylton Smith argues resulted in ‘the 
composer’s dandified façade and … musical artifice’. 133  It is specifically the 
connection between Ravel’s pudeur and the distancing devices that comprise it that 
are of most significance to this thesis. 
Our koan therefore, may be located in Ravel’s (albeit alleged) proclamation 
that ‘one doesn’t have to open up one’s chest to prove one has a heart’.134 While 
Hylton Smith cautions that ‘to cite Ravel’s pudeur is to run the risk of representing a 
                                                            
128 [n.a.], ‘A visit with Maurice Ravel’, De Telegraaf (31 March 1931), 472. Also 
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Ravel, 348. 
133 Smith, ‘Touching Maurice: A Body-Based Reading of Ravel’s Ondine’, iv. 
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one dimensional type, or erecting an all-too-familiar cardboard cutout’,135 after we 
apply psychobiographical indicators of saliency to it, it becomes clear that Ravel’s 
pudeur may hold deep psychobiographical significance; a significance that musico-
psychobiographical investigation may elucidate. 
 
 
Irving Alexander and psychological 
saliencies 
 
Irving Alexander’s 1990 publication Personology: Method and Content in 
Personality Assessment and Psychobiography proposed criteria by which to assess 
psychological saliency in the biographical data of psychobiographical subjects. 
Schultz has adapted these criteria and reproduces them as a table (see Table 3 
below). 
 
Table 3 ‘Primary indicators of psychological saliency’136 
                                                            
135 Smith, ‘Touching Maurice: A Body-Based Reading of Ravel’s Ondine’, iv. 
136 Reproduced with permission from Oxford University Press. See Schultz, ‘How to 
Strike Psychological Pay Dirt in Biographical Data’, 44. 
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Schultz asserts that (in his experience) the most useful of the indicators above is that 
of frequency, or repetition. For Freud, repetition denotes neurosis (‘repetition 
compulsion’) and repetitive actions ‘signal the presence of a core conflict demanding 
disguised expression … [and] comprise nuclear constituents of personality’.137 
 Therefore, according to these diagnostic guidelines, Ravel’s pudeur seems to 
denote a psychobiographical saliency, given its prevalence and pervasive influence 
on the fabric of his life – its frequency. It also appears to fit other criteria: we might 
observe Ravel’s pudeur in relation to the second and third criteria of primacy and 
emphasis. Certainly, Ravel’s use of ‘classicising titles’ and the fact that he never 
abandoned his use of traditional forms138 denotes a generalised primacy in terms of 
its immediate expression of a work’s classical nature, and Ravel’s compositional 
output is replete with the emphatic emphasis of expressing ‘otherness’ – we will 
examine in a moment how both features of ‘classicisation’ and ‘otherness’ are linked 
to pudeur via their employment as distancing devices. 
Ravel’s pudeur was a prevalent feature of his compositional aesthetic – 
manifested as distancing devices in his music’s evocation of tradition and the 
musical past (‘classicisation’), and its evocations of other cultures, worlds, genres, 
and so on (‘otherness’). Robert Orledge argues that Ravel’s ‘exoticism’ (or evocation 
of ‘otherness’) was employed in part as a distancing device;139 he also states that  ‘If 
various threads run across his career – like the dance, the culte de passé, Spanish 
evocations and deliberate artificiality – then exoticism embraces them all and in one 
form or another pervades his entire output’.140 
In terms of Ravel’s relationship to the musical past, the distinction between 
‘classicism’ and ‘classicality’ observed by Jim Samson is helpful: in a discussion of 
the attitudes of Busoni and Stravinsky towards the music of the past, Samson 
observes that Roman Vlad has made a distinction between the superficial appearance 
of musical references to tradition, and those resulting from a more personal aesthetic, 
citing 
Stravinsky’s ‘classicism’, concerned with external forms and 
                                                            
137 Ibid., 43. 
138 Kelly, ‘History and Homage’, 26. 
139 Orledge, ‘Evocations of Exoticism’, 39.  
140 Ibid., 46. 
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patterns derived from existing classical models, and Busoni’s 
‘classicality’, relating to the disposition of the artist, to his 
attitude towards his creative work.141 
In relation to Ravel, both classicism and classicality simultaneously prevail in his 
works, in part evinced by the prevalence of classicising titles that Kelly noted above. 
Ravel’s classicism was the result of his classicality, and through the evocation of the 
past afforded by his use of, for example, traditional forms (in Chapter Five we 
examine in detail the minuet form and its function) we might describe it as another 
form of creating distance. 
Ravel acknowledged the indebtedness of his aesthetic to his predecessors: as 
Kelly notes: ‘[Ravel] placed Poe alongside Fauré and Gedalge as his third 
teacher’.142 However, it is Ravel’s acknowledgment of Poe’s influence that is the 
most significant, as it provides us with a link to a vehicle of personal distancing in 
Ravel’s life – most often described in terms of Dandyism – which is a thematic 
element in the works of a number of writers Ravel familiarised himself with at an 
early age. Gerald Larner has credited Viñes as an instrumental influence in Ravel’s 
burgeoning literary curiosities beginning in his early adolescence: 
[Viñes] was to join his friend in an orgy of reading, of books 
exchanged, books borrowed, books which failed to return. 
Most of it was by contemporary French writers of the 
decadent tendency, above all the ‘damned poets’ as Paul 
Verlaine identified them in his study of 1884.143 
The books that comprised Ravel’s ‘orgy of reading’ may well have included Joris 
Karl Huysmans’s novel A Rebours. It is the novel’s central character, Des Esseintes, 
that Larner believes served as a precious example to Ravel, ‘[guiding him] through a 
rarefied course in artistic taste’.144 This artistic taste was, of course, presented by 
Huysmans as that of the dandy, and it is telling to note that Des Esseintes’ literary 
tastes uncannily mirrored those of Ravel’s: Baudelaire, Mallarmé, and, of course, 
Poe. Poe’s The Philosophy of Composition advocated, amongst other things, art for 
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art’s sake – that ‘art should express nothing but beauty, tempered only by taste’.145 In 
other words, Poe advocated an aesthetic distance between an author’s personal 
temperament and their work, and Ravel amalgamated the dandyish artificiality that 
arises as a result into his own personality. 
Relating back to Chapter Two, we now move to a discussion of pathography 
in Ravel. To recap, pathography can be described as psychobiography ‘by diagnosis’, 
and it is considered to be a reductive and limited means of explaining away a 
psychobiographical subject’s life. R. A. Henson’s clinical observations of Ravel’s 
terminal brain disease, while not a work of psychobiography, highlight this danger. 
He writes: ‘There are indications of nervous disorder [in Ravel] from before the First 
World War, but his experience in that conflict … and the death of his mother were 
aggravating influences from 1917 onwards’.146 Henson here is referring to Ravel’s 
brain disorder which, following a craniotomy performed in the winter of 1937, he 
finally succumbed to. Henson continues: 
Important premorbid psychological factors included 
remarkable dependence on his family (especially his mother) 
and his compulsive or obsessional behaviour, evinced by his 
self critical and fastidious nature from an early age, his 
compositional methods, and his collection of bibelots and 
mechanical toys.147 
If we were to designate factors such as Ravel’s dependence on his family or his 
fastidious nature as mere premorbid symptoms of disease, we would close the case 
(psychobiographically speaking) by reducing the meaning and significance they 
might potentially hold to nothing more than a quantifiable measure of (and 
constituent part to) a disease. Although it might be tempting to pursue the effects of 
Ravel’s illness on his later compositions (similar to the example of Beethoven we 
explored in Chapter One), in order for us to avoid an instance of pathography, we 
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146 Henson, ‘Maurice Ravel’s Illness’, 1586, accessed at JSTOR (on 17 July 2011). 
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illness: see Baeck, ‘The Longstanding Medical Fascination with “le cas Ravel”’, 
187–208. 
147 Ibid. 
 60 
need to explore the dense network of connections between the factors Henson 
identifies and Ravel’s life and work – in non-reductive terms. Criticism aside, 
Henson’s uncovering of Ravel’s marked dependence on his mother as a factor of 
importance in his life (albeit a slightly different kind of importance) points to a 
second important saliency: that of Ravel’s relationship with his mother (a ‘veritable 
cult’, proclaimed an exasperated Hélène Jourdan-Morhange).148 Nichols’s comments 
sum up this profound emotional attachment, and illustrate its prevalence in 
commentary: 
[His mother’s] gift … was simply love. Between the two 
there was from his earliest days one of those are very close 
and powerful relationships that sometimes link mother and 
son…. His professed attitude to her was one of devoted 
forbearance, even pity – but his friends were unanimous in 
diagnosing a much deeper and more important attachment 
than this. Possibly Maurice himself was reluctant fully to 
admit his dependence on her until the shock of her death in 
1917.149 
 
 
L’Enfant as subject 
 
Roger Nichols’s comprehensive catalogue of Ravel’s works numbers them at just 
over 100.150 Although this seems a relatively small output in comparison to other 
composers, the question must still be asked – especially since, according to my 
premise, almost any product of Ravel’s creativity holds the potential to yield 
significant psychobiographical meaning – why L’Enfant as a case study? 
One answer resides in the richness of interpretive possibilities afforded by the 
opera. It is a mélange of musical styles, a sort of compendium of musical 
characterisations that Ravel had perfected across the span of his career; it is also 
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written in the spirit of the French opéra-ballet, so dances are inevitably evoked. 
Equally important is the fact that it contains both music and text, both of which are 
interpretive lines of enquiry in their own right, as is the resultant relationship 
between them. A further answer comes when we consider the psychological narrative 
described by the music and libretto, as we will examine in detail in Chapter Five. 
Childhood and the figure of the mother both describe saliencies we wish to 
pursue in our enquiry, and as such it makes sense to seek them in L’Enfant. Richard 
Langham Smith’s opinions on the opera explain this significance in its treatment of 
the subject of childhood: 
recently we have discovered that underneath [the opera is] a 
much rawer side, and also a much more psychologically 
probing side ... [it] is about growing into adolescence, and it 
divides very clearly into two parts ... the first part is of a child 
rebelling violently against the mother, and … the second part 
[is of] a growth into altruism – the child realises that he has 
done damage to the creatures and he ‘grows up’ through a 
process of reparation … to grow up the child has to, in some 
way, go back on [his] ‘naughty’ self, on [his] destructive 
elements, and begin to realise the altruistic, and that’s why I 
think that of all pieces about childhood, Ravel’s opera is 
supreme.151 
Reparation, and the general psychological narrative of the opera, is a subject we will 
come to focus on in the next chapter. 
L’Enfant’s context amid Ravel’s chronology provides us with another answer 
as to why the opera might hold crucial clues to our investigation (see Table 4 below).  
                                                            
151 Langham Smith (et al.), in ‘Ravel Double Bill Podcast’, (accessed 7 December 
2012). 
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Table 4 Chronology surrounding L’Enfant 
1915 February Enlists as a truck driver and is posted to Verdun  
1917 January Mother dies 
1920 April Begins L’Enfant et les sortilèges 
1921 May Moves into Le Belvédère 
1925 March Première of L’Enfant et les sortilèges in Monte 
Carlo 
1933  First signs of fatal illness152 
1937 December Brain operation performed; Ravel dies aged 62 
 
As evinced above, the creation of L’Enfant is framed by the ‘succession of traumas’ I 
referred to earlier – enlistment in the First World War, the loss of his beloved 
mother, and the onset of the tragic and debilitating illness that was to cause his 
eventual death. L’Enfant’s proximity to these traumas – both chronological and 
emotional – clearly suggests that the work might hold a profound level of personal 
importance and emotional significance to an ‘unusually vulnerable and sensitive life’ 
put to the test. 
Certain aspects of the context out of which L’Enfant came into being are of 
importance to our understanding of its meaning, as are certain aspects of its 
authorship – as Kilpatrick has observed, ‘questions of personality and the minutiae of 
authorship have long pervaded discussions of this most intriguing of 
collaborations’.153 
 
 
Collaboration, context and 
psychobiographical agencies 
 
L’Enfant’s authorship is a complex issue since, unavoidably, it is not just one 
person’s psychology in operation: Colette was responsible for the libretto, and 
therefore the essential content of the textual narrative – the story itself – and how it is 
                                                            
152 Although Henson disputes this: see Henson, ‘Maurice Ravel’s Illness’, 1586, 
accessed at JSTOR (on 17 July 2011). 
153 Kilpatrick, ‘Enchantments and Illusions: Recasting the Creation of L’Enfant et les 
sortilèges’, 33. 
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specifically expressed (with a few notable exceptions on Ravel’s part). It was, we 
may presume, then down to Ravel to add the music that brought Colette’s libretto to 
life. Since our concern is with Ravel and not Colette, we must assume that Ravel’s 
act of composing for Colette’s libretto is commensurate with having been equally 
authorially responsible for the narrative itself. This assumption is acceptable insofar 
that it is plain Ravel was not a passive force in L’Enfant’s creation – regardless of 
which of the pair wrote the libretto, Ravel actively participated in and emotionally 
engaged with the collaborative creative effort.154 In terms of the psychological 
agencies pertaining to the creation of the work, Ravel, in composing the music for 
the libretto, amalgamated its content into his creative psyche in no less meaningful a 
way than if he had written the libretto himself – composing the music with the 
libretto. Emily Kilpatrick notes that Raymond Balliman, in a review of 1926, 
declared that ‘the union of poetry and music is such that it is impossible to separate 
the collaborators’.155 It is as much Ravel’s creation as it is Colette’s. We can assume 
that Ravel approved of and, on a deep psychological level, ‘agreed with’ its content, 
since he accepted the commission in the first instance and was at liberty to request 
changes during the collaborative process. 
In the reading in the next chapter, we may, through the practical application 
of musico-psychobiography, come to some form of conclusion that will elucidate a 
connection between the saliencies of distance (in Ravel’s life and works) and his 
relationship to his childhood and his mother. In addition, since the minutiae of 
Ravel’s psychological relationship to his mother are not represented in biographical 
commentary, in elucidating a link between Ravel’s life and work, L’Enfant’s 
portrayal of the psychological relationship between the Child and his Mother may 
provide us with the detail we seek. The mystery resides in the complex 
                                                            
154 Despite the ‘dearth of documented information’ Kilpatrick refers to, there are 
extant letters which describe Ravel’s direct (if minor) involvement in making 
changes to the libretto: for examples, see Kilpatrick, ‘Enchantments and Illusions: 
Recasting the Creation of L’Enfant et les sortilèges’, 32 and 36. 
155 Balliman, review of ‘L’Enfant et les sortilèges’, Lyrica (February 1926), 693; see 
Kilpatrick, ‘Enchantments and Illusions: Recasting the Creation of L’Enfant et les 
sortilèges’, 31. 
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interrelationships and connections between these saliencies: Chapter Five deals with 
its elucidation.  
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5 
Psychological conflicts and their 
resolution in L’Enfant et les 
sortilèges 
 
 
Practically applying musico-psychobiography 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to put into practice the methodology outlined in Part 
One. The psychobiographical themes pertaining to Ravel’s life identified in the 
previous chapter are here explored in relation to L’Enfant et les sortilèges. 
 The process of the psychobiographical reading of L’Enfant presented here is 
twofold. We begin by exploring the opera’s articulation of the psychological 
narrative of its eponymous protagonist. This will allow us to examine ‘hidden’ 
meaning that originates from, and resides within, the domain of the work – that is, 
meaning that pertains exclusively to the work and not (at least in a practical sense) 
the composer. However, in order to proceed on a psychobiographical basis, these 
interpretive findings must be integrated with knowledge of Ravel’s personal 
psychology, which we explored in the previous chapter. The avenue of interpretation 
made available as a result will allow us then to scrutinise and understand the work 
through the lens of Ravel’s psychology, revealing new interpretive perspectives on 
the opera and, through its demonstration of a meaningful reciprocity between the 
work and the life, new psychological perspectives on Ravel himself. However, 
before we begin, the epistemological implications of such a pursuit must be 
addressed. 
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Epistemological interpretive implications 
 
Two of the eleven theses and counterstatements posited by Lawrence Kramer on 
interpretation make for an apt starting point. I have summarised his positions below: 
Interpretation is neither the uncovering of a hidden meaning 
nor the annunciation of a fixed one. It neither decodes nor 
deciphers. It demonstrates ... what may be shown by the work 
it addresses and by which it seeks to be addressed. 
Interpretation does not seek to extract a meaning that has 
been implanted or sedimented in its object. The meaning it 
produces is never immanent. Nor does interpretation attach 
meanings to an object that would otherwise lack them.... Its 
claim ... is to enunciate a meaning that has always already 
been inscribed by (or through, never in) the object but only 
after the interpretation has intervened, altering the view 
through a hermeneutic window.156 
One especially important conclusion we may draw from Kramer’s formulations of 
hermeneutic interpretation is the idea that meaning is not a fixed, predetermined 
entity existing within a work, simply awaiting the interpreter’s discovery. This view 
of interpretation guards against the danger of, to paraphrase Barthes’s comments 
from Part One, furnishing the work with a final signified, and closing the writing.157 
                                                            
156 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 7–8. I have preserved Kramer’s emphasis as 
underlined text; my emphases are indicated in italics. According to Kramer, 
‘Hermeneutic windows tend to be located where the object of interpretation 
appears – or can be made to appear – explicitly problematical. Interpretation takes 
flight from breaking points, which usually means from points of under or 
overdetermination: on the one hand, a gap, a lack, a missing connection; on the 
other, a surplus of pattern, an extra repetition, and excessive connection’; Berk 
Sirman explains that the concept of hermeneutic windows allows Kramer to 
interpret music ‘as a set of humanly significant actions’. Kramer, ‘Tropes and 
Windows: An Outline of Musical Hermeneutics’, 12; Sirman, ‘Music vs. Words: 
Exploring the Problematic State of Semantic Meaning in Music’, 12. 
157 See Rice and Waugh, Modern Literary Theory, 187. 
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Indeed, neither signified nor signifier are fixed entities in this instance, since, as 
Kramer argues, their nature and existence are both dependent on the very act of 
interpretation. 
This is an important concept to this chapter, in which the hermeneutic sense 
of interpretation is employed; propounding any sense of limiting the work’s meaning 
by a focus on its author is to be avoided. Richard Langham Smith’s concluding 
remarks to his reading of both operas in Ravel’s output – L’Heure espagnole and 
L’Enfant – caution against interpreting either opera with undue reference to their 
author. He hopes that his study 
may fall into the category of ‘hidden depths’, approaching 
less from the stance of composer – and author – intention 
than from the other end: the ways in which art-works acquire 
significance through their subsequent interpretation and 
reception.158 
This wariness appears directed at readings of musical works where, in focussing on 
the author’s intention, we might assume the author’s conscious inclusion of personal 
(read: biographical) meaning in their work. Langham Smith regards L’Enfant as ‘a 
work with psychological overtones of which neither librettist nor composer were 
entirely aware’.159 
While he may have hit the mark in stating that perhaps neither Ravel nor 
Colette (L’Enfant’s librettist) were aware of including in the work’s creation certain 
aspects or symbolic representations/reflections of their personal psychologies (or, 
equally, ‘psychological overtones’ which bore no direct or demonstrable relationship 
to their personal lives but were created incidentally), my reading of L’Enfant is in 
contrast to the type Langham Smith warns against. 
 Langham Smith acknowledges the psychological overtones expressed in the 
opera but does not ascribe them to the personal psychologies of their authors, 
preferring instead an interpretation grounded in theories of reception. My 
psychobiographical reading also interprets and analyses the psychological content of 
the opera, but it does not so much ascribe such content to the authors as read it 
against the backdrop of their personal emotional/psychological lives: compare this to 
                                                            
158 Langham Smith, ‘Ravel’s Operatic Spectacles’, 210. 
159 Ibid. 
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the points I have underlined in Kramer’s descriptions of interpretation above. This is 
a contrast between viewing meaning (in this case, the most significant meaning 
would be considered as those aspects of the author’s deepest self impressed upon the 
work) as being willingly/consciously imposed on the work by the author – thus 
limiting its interpretive possibilities – and meaning as being 
unwittingly/unconsciously encoded in the work. In the latter case, the unconsciously 
encoded meaning constitutes only part of the work’s totality of significance, but it is 
investigated as a broadening of interpretive possibilities.  
 My reading of L’Enfant is therefore not concerned with seeking to prove that 
Ravel composed ‘intentionally’ in a certain way because of 
biographical/psychological factors at work in his personal life – a very basic example 
of this might be: Ravel chose to write an opera about a child who misses their mother 
as a result of his close relationship to his mother. Rather, it is my intention to 
demonstrate that Ravel’s work can be read or interpreted in a certain way in light of 
psychobiographical insights (such as the possibility he wrote in a certain way 
because he loved his mother too much): this type of hermeneutic psychobiography 
represents an alternative to the empiricism and dogmatism we wish to avoid. Just as 
therapy can reveal motivations that may never have been consciously intentional, I 
will demonstrate that psychobiography can be used to uncover things in Ravel’s 
music that are arguably linked to his life, but were not necessarily intentional at a 
conscious level in his mind. Doing so thus circumvents the objection that viewing the 
meaning of a work through the lens of the author is to give them a monopoly over 
the signification of its meaning. Indeed, Langham Smith asserts that part of 
L’Enfant’s durability ‘lies in its potential for varying interpretations’.160 
 The psychobiographical reading of L’Enfant presented in this chapter 
proposes that the latent psychological content (as I have interpreted it) expressed 
through the work’s narrative and emotional structures, and the interaction between 
them reflect, or at least appear to reflect, certain salient features of Ravel’s 
observable psychology – whether consciously encoded in the work by Ravel or not. 
Furthermore, given Ravel’s emotional proximity to the subject matter addressed in 
the opera – on an ostensible level it is about nothing more than a boy who misses his 
mother – and given that, in contrast to Ravel’s emotional life, the opera broadly 
                                                            
160 Ibid. 
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represents the successful fulfilment (reflected both musically and narratologically, 
both structurally and emotionally) of a fundamental emotional conflict, it is proposed 
that Ravel may have engaged in a form of projective identification in the opera’s 
creation, through which he was able to, perhaps unconsciously, vicariously address 
an emotional struggle in his life that was never fully resolved. 
 The substance of L’Enfant’s latent psychological content, the process of 
emotional conflict and resolution it delineates and the means through which it is 
expressed/represented is therefore this chapter’s focus. This content will be 
examined in parallel to a psychobiographical discussion of how the opera might 
function as a mirror of Ravel’s fundamental emotional world – or, of course, vice 
versa. 
 
 
Psychological content: substance, process, and 
expression in the plane of ‘the work’ 
 
I have structured the psychobiographical element of this chapter in two sections that 
broadly reflect the categories of the work and the life. This section is devoted to 
analysing the psychological content that is expressed in the work itself and that 
which operates in the plane of the work – that is, that which applies only to the 
narrative of the Child in the work and not aspects of Ravel’s psychology. The next 
section will then examine, through a detailed analysis of key scenes, how these 
factors relate psychobiographically to Ravel’s life. To begin our assessment of the 
psychological content of L’Enfant, let us first consider the outline of the story as it is 
expressed in Colette’s libretto, from which we can begin to draw out the 
psychological undercurrents it appears to describe. 
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L’Enfant synopsis161 
 
Part One of L’Enfant et les Sortiléges begins with its eponymous protagonist, the 
Child, seated one afternoon before his unfinished arithmetic homework 
(‘Prologue’/’J’ai pas envie de faire ma page...’). In his opening monologue, the Child 
sulkily professes his desire to do anything but this homework. His mother’s 
subsequent entrance is heralded by the appearance of a large skirt – the stage 
directions inform us that the dimensions of the set should be designed so as to 
emphasise the smallness of the Child.162 Affectionately referring to the Child as 
‘Bébé’, she finds that he has not finished his homework and has spilled ink on the 
carpet; we learn also that he neither regrets his laziness, nor will he promise to finish 
his homework. Mother’s patience wanes and, after the Child rudely sticks out his 
tongue, she presents him with the punishment of dry bread and sugarless tea,163 and 
tells him to remain alone until dinner. After entreating the Child to consider his 
wrongs and, above all, Mother’s displeasure, she exits. This is the last we see or hear 
of Mother for the entire opera. 
 Now he is alone, the Child is suddenly gripped by ‘a frenzy of perversity’164 
(‘Child’s ‘Frenzy’/’Ça m’est égal!’) and, after proclaiming his delight in solitude, 
naughtiness and dislike toward others, he embarks on a path of wanton destruction. 
His actions, and their results, are the catalysing factor in propelling the narrative of 
the remainder of the opera, as the ensuing succession of musical and dramatic 
vignettes in the first part of the opera sees the objects come to life and reproach the 
Child for his misbehaviour. His perverse, sadistic frenzy is directed towards the 
                                                            
161 For clarity in this discussion, the descriptions of each scene appear alongside titles 
(in parentheses) according to how I have chosen to break down the opera’s scenic 
structure. 
162 «l’échelle de tout le décor où tous les objets assument des dimensions exagérées, 
pour rendre frappante la petitesse de l’Enfant», 3. Page references following 
quoted lyrics or stage directions refer to their location in Durand’s vocal and 
piano score; elsewhere, I refer to Durand’s miniature score. See Resource List for 
publication details. 
163 «le goûter d’un méchant enfant», 4. 
164 «une frénésie de perversité», 5. 
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objects and animals in his immediate environment: he smashes the Teacup and 
Teapot, pokes the caged Squirrel with a steel pen, pulls the Cat’s tail, upsets the Fire 
with a poker and overturns the kettle, slashes the wallpaper, pulls off the pendulum 
of the Comtoise Clock (or Grandfather Clock) and tears up both his Arithmetic 
homework and the storybook, the latter of which tells the story of an enchanted 
Princess. 
Exhausted, he goes to sit in an armchair, but to his horror it comes to life, 
limping away towards a little Louis XV Bergère (‘Chairs’ Dance’/’Votre serviteur 
humble...’). They join together in a dance, while berating the ‘wicked-heeled’165 
Child for some unknown misdeed – presumably some act of vandalism towards 
them. They resolve to withhold the comforts they might once have offered him,166 
and rid themselves forever of his nuisance. The line ‘And then… who knows?’167 
forebodingly foretells the retributions in store yet to be experienced by the Child and, 
at the end of the scene, the Bench, the Settee, the Pouffe and the Wicker Chair join 
forces with the Chair against him, rejoicing in chorus ‘No more of the Child!’168 
The Comtoise Clock, whose pendulum the Child earlier broke off, now 
springs into life (‘Comtoise Clock’/’Ding, ding, ding, ding...’). Having had its 
mechanism broken, it dementedly paces the stage, unable to cease chiming. The 
clock sings at length of its shame and grief at not being able to keep time, or to stop 
chiming. Eventually, its mechanism appears to wind down and it comes to a halt 
facing the wall. 
Suddenly, two small, nasal voices are heard from the floor. They are those of 
the Teapot and Cup, the former now appearing in the affected guise of a champion 
boxer, the latter an elegant ballerina-esque pastiche (‘Teapot and Cup – Ragtime and 
Foxtrot’/’How’s your mug?/Keng-ça-fou, Mah-jong...’). The teapot is accompanied 
by a ragtime dance, and the teacup, a foxtrot. At the end of their dance, they 
                                                            
165 «cet Enfant aux talons méchant», 10–11. 
166 ‘cushions for his sleep … seats for his reverie’. «coussins pour son sommeil … 
sièges pour sa rêverie», 11. 
167 «Et encor... qui sait?», 12. 
168 «Plus de l’Enfant!», 14. 
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disappear. Stricken,169 the Child laments the loss of his beautiful Chinese cup. The 
sun has by now set, flooding the stage with a red light. 
Shivering with fear and loneliness, the Child then turns to the fire for comfort 
and warmth, but the fire jumps from the fireplace, threatening and frightening him 
(‘Fire’/’Arrière!’). Twilight approaches when, suddenly, little sounds of laughter are 
heard. 
From the torn pieces of wallpaper, which depicted a sheepfold, now emerges 
a procession of shepherds, shepherdesses, sheep, dogs and goats (‘Shepherds and 
Shepherdesses’/’Adieu, pastourelles... Pastoureaux, adieu!’). They traverse the stage 
lamenting the loss of their dwelling place and they join in dance to express the grief 
at their separation from each other.170 They too then disappear to the sound of their 
bagpipes and tambourines. The Child, prostrate on the stage, weeps. He is lying on a 
pile of the torn pages of the storybook and the Arithmetic homework. One of these 
large pages begins to rise like a slab of marble, from beneath which the beautiful 
Princess of the storybook emerges. 
The Child is enraptured by her appearance (‘Princess’/’Oui, c’est Elle...’). 
We learn that the Child, having begun to read the story yesterday, was kept awake by 
dreams of her, as he has fallen in love. However, now that he has destroyed the book, 
her life is in peril: perhaps the malicious enchanter will put her to sleep forever, she 
sings, or transfigure her into a cloud. The Child then remembers the Prince and his 
sword, who he assures her will come to her aid. Lamenting his lack of a sword, he 
resolves to defend the Princess himself and attempts to hold her within his arms. She 
spurns his advances, calling him her little feeble friend.171 The Child, now alone and 
devastated at her disappearance, sings a simple and poignant love song lamenting her 
loss (‘Child’/’Toi, le coeur de la rose...’). In vain, he seeks the ending of the story 
amongst the scattered pages, from which suddenly appear the menacing little forms 
of the numbers from his arithmetic homework. 
Arithmetic, personified as a little old man, menacingly shouts arithmetic 
problems that do not make sense at the Child (‘Arithmetic’/’Deux robinets coulent 
                                                            
169 «atteré», 25. 
170 ‘Our passions seemed eternal’. «Nos amours semblaient éternelles», 35. 
171 The Princess’s gesture of entwining her arms is a physical manifestation of this 
rejection. «[La Princesse], se tordant les bras », 48. 
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dans un réservoir!’). He is joined by the Numbers, who drag the Child into a 
demented round. The Child, dizzy, falls to the ground as the little old man and the 
numbers, one by one, exit the stage. By now the moon has risen and it is night. 
The Child, again exhausted, notices the Cat crawling out from underneath a 
chair. A white Cat appears. The following ‘dialogue’ between them – they only 
miaow – describes a scenario of erotic seduction (Duo miaulé/’C’est toi, Chat?’) in 
which the black Cat is the seducer, and as the music reaches a frenetic climax – 
sexual climax is heavily implied and, although it is not explicitly stated in the 
libretto, most commentators acknowledge it – the Child is transported from his room 
and into the garden, which becomes the focus of the second part of the opera. 
In part two of the opera, the scene becomes a garden filled with trees, 
flowers, a pond and a great tree trunk, as well as the music of insects, frogs, toads, 
owls, the breeze and nightingales (‘Prologue’/’Ah! quelle joie de te retrouver, 
Jardin!’). In the garden, we first meet the Trees (‘Trees’/’Nos blessures...’), whom 
the Child wounded the day before with the knife he stole. They lament their wounds, 
which still bleed sap. The stage slowly begins to fill with dragonflies and moths 
(‘Dance of the Dragonflies and the Moths – Valse Américaine’/’Où est tu? Je te 
cherche...’). Then comes the Dragonfly’s aria, in which she laments the loss of her 
companion and beseeches the Child, with increasing insistency, to return her.172 The 
Child realises, to his horror, that he has captured and killed her companion, pierced 
by his pin. The Child endures a further shock when the Bat (‘Round of the 
Bats’/’Rends-la moi!’) explains that the Child has killed his companion with a stick 
and left her babies unnourished. These horrific realisations are allowed time to settle 
in a lengthy dance sequence (‘Dance of the Frogs’), without dialogue, in which the 
frogs appear and slowly fill the stage. 
One Frog, after having danced, comes to rest at the Child’s knee. The 
Squirrel immediately warns the Frog to save herself from the prison of the cage in 
which he was held captive and earlier injured, before it is too late (‘Squirrel’/’Sauve-
toi, sotte! Et la cage?’). The Child tries to explain to the Squirrel that he kept him in a 
cage to better see his quickness, his four little paws, and his beautiful eyes. The 
                                                            
172 «Rends-la moi!», 71. 
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Squirrel replies sarcastically,173 and during his ensuing aria, the garden fills with the 
animals.174 His aria represents a crucial lesson for the Child. The Squirrel sings: 
Do you know what they reflect, my beautiful eyes? 
The free sky, the free wind, my brothers as free as birds in 
flight… 
See now what my beautiful eyes reflect as they shimmer with 
tears!175 
The Child realises that the animals, in contrast to him, are loving and happy and they 
now forget him. At this moment, the Cats reappear, and their brief display of 
affection further reinforces his words: ‘they love… they are happy … they forget me 
… I am alone’.176 This moment represents the pinnacle of the Child’s emotional 
journey, and the psychological groundwork has been laid from which the Child has 
learned his lesson. When his solitude sets in, in spite of himself, he calls out for 
Mother. 
The animals suddenly cease their revelry, realising from the Child’s cry of 
‘Maman’ that he is the child with the knife, the stick, the cage and the net; the Child 
who loves nobody and whom nobody loves (‘Animals’ Frenzy’/’C’est l’Enfant au 
couteau!’). They sing that he should not escape, but should be punished with their 
sharp claws, teeth and wings. The animals unite in violent frenzy, each animal vying 
to chastise the Child. In the confusion, the animals turn on each other, and at the 
height of the struggle the Child is thrown to the corner of the stage, wounded and 
forgotten by the animals in their own orgy of fighting. At the same time, a little 
squirrel, wounded, falls down next to him. With his cry, the animals cease their 
fighting. 
                                                            
173 ‘Yes, it was for my beautiful eyes!’. «Oui, c’était pour mes beaux yeux!», 84. 
174 ‘a paradise of love and animal joy’. «un paradis de tendresse et de joie animales.», 
85. 
175 «Sais-tu ce qu’ils reflétaient, mes beaux yeux? 
Le ciel libre, le vent libres, mes libres frères, au bond sûr comme un 
vol… 
Regarde donc ce qu’ils reflétaient mes beaux yeux tout miroitants de 
larmes!», 84–86. 
176 «Ils s’aiment... Ils sont heureux... Ils m’oublient... Je suis seul...», 86. 
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The Child takes a ribbon from his neck and binds the paw of the squirrel. The 
animals, ashamed at their behaviour and astonished to witness the Child’s 
burgeoning altruism, stand in a profound silence (‘Animals’/’Il a pansé la plaie...’). 
Seeing that he has helped the injured squirrel, and that he himself is injured and they 
do not know how to cure him, the animals resolve to call out the word the Child 
uttered moments before – ‘Maman’ – and return him to his nest. The pick him up and 
carry him, step by step, toward the house. The animals’ invocation summons the 
symbolic reappearance of Mother as a light at the window of the house (‘Finale’/’Il 
est bon, l’Enfant, il est sage...’) and so, slowly and with regret, they withdraw from 
the Child, fêting his return to Mother in a joyous procession and all the time praising 
his newfound benevolence. The animals halt their procession in the shadow of the 
trees, finally leaving the Child alone and with open arms towards the house, 
illuminated by a halo of moonlight, as he delivers the final utterance of the opera: 
‘Maman!’ 
 
 
Summary of psychological narrative 
 
Melanie Klein saw in l’Enfant a description of a psychological development 
common to all children: 
I refer to the attack on the mother’s body and on the father’s 
penis in it [this attack being of fundamental importance both 
for neurosis in boys and for their whole development]. The 
squirrel in the cage and the pendulum wrenched out of the 
clock are plain symbols of the penis in the mother’s body…. 
Now what weapons does the child employ in this attack on 
his united parents? The ink poured over the table, the emptied 
kettle, from which a cloud of ashes and steam escapes, 
represent the weapons which very little children have at their 
disposal: namely, the device of soiling with excrement.177 
Klein describes the Child’s ‘frenzy of perversity’ in terms of primary sadism, an 
                                                            
177 Klein, ‘Infantile Anxiety-Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the 
Creative Impulse’, 437. 
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‘early phase of development, the context of which is the attack made on the mother’s 
body with all the weapons that the child’s sadism has at its disposal’.178 She goes on 
to situate this stage of development at the point where Oedipus tendencies first 
appear – Oedipal significances are something we will return to – as evinced by the 
symbols Klein saw of ‘dread of castration by the father’ and ‘the attack on the 
mother’s body’ in the Squirrel and their cage, and in the Clock and its pendulum.179 
She continues: 
In ontogenetic development sadism is overcome when the 
subject advances to the genital level. The more powerfully 
this phase sets in, the more capable does the child become of 
object-love, and the more able is he to conquer his sadism by 
means of pity and sympathy. This step in development is also 
[shown] in the libretto of Ravel’s opera; when the boy feels 
pity for the wounded squirrel and comes to its aid, the hostile 
world changes into a friendly one. The child has learnt to 
love and believes in love.180 
Klein concludes her analysis by suggesting that the Child’s sadistic attacks on the 
objects had to occur ‘for he was driven to it by the pressure of the old anxiety-
situation which he had never mastered’ – in other words, the process was 
necessitated by a fundamental psychological conflict that had to be overcome. 
Richard Langham Smith calls this process of development ‘reparation’,181 and his 
analysis of L’Enfant views the content of the narrative to be marked by maternal love 
and sex. 
As we have seen from the synopsis in the previous section, the surface-level 
narrative expresses the Child’s journey from antihero to hero: his destructive 
behaviour and negative character traits transmute during the course of the opera into 
positives, and the ultimate goal is being reunited with his mother, whose absence is 
felt with ever increasing keenness from the start of the opera. There are various 
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180 Ibid., 440. 
181 Langham Smith (et al.), in ‘Ravel Double Bill Podcast’, (accessed 7 December 
2012). 
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catalysts for this transformation: the grievances imposed upon the sortilèges (and 
Mother) by the Child’s exploits, and their accompanying admonishments, offer him a 
number of lessons about himself – they are lessons he must learn whether he wants 
to or not, especially since the opera began with a lesson he certainly did not want to 
learn. 
However, as we shall see, the most significant catalyst is Mother – her 
presence (or absence) is felt throughout the opera, musically and psychologically, 
despite her short-lived appearance for all of 25 bars (out of 1352 bars, just under 2% 
of the work). Perhaps, then, it is truly a mark of Ravel’s and Colette’s genius to make 
her presence felt so keenly throughout. Through the consideration of L’Enfant’s 
depictions of Mother presented below, we are able to highlight central themes of the 
opera’s articulation of psychological narrative, both musically and textually. 
 
 
Articulations of Psychological Narrative in Musical 
Content and the Depiction of Mother 
 
The music and libretto of L’Enfant is inherently rich in interpretive possibilities. As 
such, it is necessary to impose some constraints on our enquiry. In order to focus this 
psychobiographical reading, therefore, I have limited my considerations to detailed 
analyses of scenes that I feel serve as a representative example of the whole. 
Certainly, I am aware that this reading is not comprehensive of the entire work, and 
that the possibility for further study, and indeed different interpretations to those 
posited here, is both practicable and desirable. 
 If our psychobiographical reading of L’Enfant is in part guided by the 
psychological consideration of Ravel’s relationship to his mother, we might begin 
with the idea that its locus of expression in the work may reside in its depiction/s of 
Mother, or in areas of meaningful proximity to her, and that we might therefore seek 
in these locations a psychobiographical elucidation of that relationship. These 
proximities, as we will see, arise from a matrix of motivic and structural connections 
to her, which influence our associations by the contexts in which these connections 
appear. 
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 As I previously mentioned, Mother’s physical presence on stage during the 
opera lasts for all of 25 bars – from Fig. 3+3 to Fig. 7-1.182 I argued that despite her 
transient physical appearance, Mother’s presence or absence is keenly felt 
throughout the opera from beginning to end. This is apparent as her centrality to the 
narrative is slowly revealed: the Child mentions her as an object of his frustration at 
the beginning before she has even made her entrance (‘I want to make Mother stand 
in the corner’, Fig. 3-2),183 he calls out for her in spite of himself after he is left 
feeling abandoned by the animals (‘in spite of himself he calls “Maman”’,184 Fig. 
135+2), her symbolic return is represented by a light appearing at the window of the 
house near the end of the opera (Fig. 149+3) and the Child calls out her name with 
open arms as he is returned home by the animals (Fig. 154+2). Her positioning at 
crucial turning points in the narrative makes her presence, and indeed her absence, 
all the more palpable and significant. 
 However, it is only when we consider the music that accompanies moments 
such as these that the full picture of Mother’s deeply pervasive significance to the 
opera begins to emerge – and it is the complexities of this significance that we must 
unpick here. To focus our discussion of this music, I have centred on the opening 
two scenes of the opera (Fig. 1-11 to Fig. 7-1) in which we first meet the Child and his 
Mother, and the final scene in which he is returned to her (Fig. 149+3 to the end). The 
opening scenes contain the seeds of critical musical and psychological motifs that 
develop across the span of the opera, and in the final scene both music and narrative 
combine to bring resolution to the conflict that has developed during the opera. 
While there are some features of these scenes that do not bear ‘direct’ references to 
Mother, the proximity of their essential content and context to her musical and 
narratological implies important connections, as we will see. 
 The stage direction provided by Colette makes for an apt starting point. Aside 
from her description of the room in which the first half of the opera takes place, 
which, for Kilpatrick, is indicative of a lifestyle in which the child could want for 
                                                            
182 Instead of bar numbers, specific bars are indicated by their location in relation to 
the nearest rehearsal mark in the Durand miniature score: e.g. Fig. 1+1 denotes the 
second bar of Fig. 1, Fig. 2-2 denotes two bars before it, etc. 
183 «J’ai envie de mettre Maman en pénitence», 3. 
184 «malgré lui il appelle [‘Maman!’]», 86. 
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nothing,185 her notes on the scale of the scenography are important. As I mentioned 
earlier, she writes that ‘[the] ceiling [is] very low and the scale of all the furnishings 
and all the objects [appear] in exaggerated dimensions to make striking the smallness 
of the child’.186 The visual effect of this distortion of perspective is one that creates a 
sense of claustrophobia and confinement – the Squirrel’s cage too becomes a symbol 
of confinement, from which both he and the Child are set free. This is the first theme 
that is carried through the opera, which we can interpret as a psychological device. 
The confinement and closed-ness expressed in the staging Colette stipulates is 
reflected both musically, in terms of the structures Ravel employs and the 
development of musical material within them, and in the child’s psychology, as he 
presents himself as being developmentally ‘close-minded’. Langham Smith 
identified this process with that of reparation: ‘that to grow up the child has to in 
some way go back on its ‘naughty’ self, on its destructive elements, and begin to 
realise the altruistic’.187 Over the course of the opera, these reflections assume 
changing roles as confinement transitions into openness.188 
 
 
Prologue (Fig. 1-11 to Fig. 3+2) 
 
The meandering opening line, played by two solo oboes, gives the impression of 
great rhythmic flexibility. Written in continuous quavers, for nearly 36 bars, the 
metre seems to change at random: 8/8, 5/8, 7/8, 4/8, 7/8, 3/8, 7/8, 9/8, 6/8, 7/8, 6/8 
for each of the eleven bars of the asymmetric phrase. The melodic content consists of 
movement in parallel fourths and fifths, and it describes a largely pentatonic scale 
                                                            
185 Kilpatrick, ‘The Language of Enchantment: Childhood and Fairytale in the Music 
of Maurice Ravel’, 170. 
186 «le plafond très bas et l’échelle de tout le décor où tous les objets assument des 
dimensions exagérées, pour rendre frappante la petitesse de l’Enfant», 3. 
187 Langham Smith (et al.), in ‘Ravel Double Bill Podcast’, (accessed 7 December 
2012). 
188 Kilpatrick identifies this in similar terms as a transition from ‘enclosure’ to 
‘liberation’: see Kilpatrick, ‘Enchantments and Illusions: Recasting the Creation 
of L’Enfant et les sortilèges’, 48. 
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(D, E, [F#], G, A, B). These factors combine to give a curious mixture of oriental and 
medieval flavours and cause a sense of ambiguity between E minor and G major, 
which is reinforced by the absence of regular agogic stresses to mark a regular metre. 
The entrance of the double bass solo at Fig. 1 adds to the confusion, its melody 
(notated entirely in harmonics) describing the dorian mode and, through the lack of 
false relations, implying a G major7 harmony. The harmonic and metric ambiguity of 
this 11-bar phrase bears a significance that becomes apparent only in the closing bars 
of the opera, as we shall see. However, the perceived freedom invoked by this phrase 
is falsified by its position in a structure that frames its exact threefold repetition: this 
11-bar oboe phrase is repeated verbatim, followed after its third iteration by a three-
bar coda. The second iteration introduces the solo double bass (and the rising of the 
curtain, at Fig. 1) and the third introduces the Child’s vocal line (the double bass solo 
is also simultaneously repeated, at Fig. 2). The quasi-mechanical structure, therefore, 
gives the impression that the music could continue forever, and becomes associated 
with the child’s distraction and daydreaming. This notion of autonomous structure 
and its relationship to mechanism is discussed later. This effect is compounded by its 
ambiguity, and ironic lack of grounding given that a double bass is involved. The 
progressive addition of musical lines in an unchanging structure and the enclosure it 
implies presages the themes of conflict, resolution and the progression from musical 
restriction to freedom in the remainder of the opera. 
 
 
Mother (Fig. 3+2 to Fig. 7-1) 
 
Mother’s entrance, which abruptly interrupts the music of the child’s reverie, is 
heralded by the appearance of a descending fourth motif, heard in the woodwinds at 
Fig. 3+2. It is a change of pace and colour, and the presence of a bass note literally 
grounds us in reality. From this point onwards, Mother becomes associated with the 
descending melodic fourth and its harmonisation as an interrupted cadence. In this 
section alone, it is heard six times in full. The melodic fourth, when it appears in 
different contexts, may then serve an explanatory function in the narrative from the 
point of reference to Mother. For example, in the previous section, the child’s 
aggression towards his mother is compounded (see Example 1 below) by the 
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presence of her melodic fourths. We can thus understand retrospectively the 
significance of the melodic fourths (denoted by a) once they are associated with 
Mother – in this case, it reinforces the fact that the Child’s aggression is directed 
towards Mother. 
 
Example 1 Melodic fourths in opening (Fig. 3-2) 
 
 
This association is compounded further by the subtle structural reciprocity between 
the melodic fourth and the harmonic fourths of the opening oboe line (see Example 2 
below): the fourth appears to be the basis of its construction (as it appears in the form 
of an inverted fifth, denoted by the bracketed noteheads). 
 
Example 2 Fourths/inverted fifths of opening solo oboe line (Fig. 1-11) 
 
 
The word ‘pénitence’ in the Child’s opening monologue carries a double meaning: 
aside from its literal meaning of ‘penitence’, in this context it can be idiomatically 
translated to mean ‘to put in the corner’. Therefore the melodic fourths, which (two 
bars after this moment) bear connections to Mother, here express a desire on the 
Child’s part to punish Mother for some alleged wrong. This effect is compounded in 
the scene following Mother’s exit, where the Child unleashes his anger in a violent 
rampage, through the presence of melodic fourths (and their associated corrupted 
transformations, as we will see), and the text that they delineate (see Example 3 
below).  
 82 
Example 3 Mother’s melodic fourth (a) and ‘corrupted’ tritone (x) in 
Child’s ‘frenzy’ (Fig. 8/Fig. 15-5) 
 
 
 
Mother’s descending fourth (a) and its derivative (x) are thus inextricably linked with 
the Child’s love-lessness that influences the overarching psychological narrative – he 
must learn to learn to love (in the altruistic and the romantic, sexual sense) to bring 
the opera to its resolution. The musical connection, then, between the Child’s love-
lessness and its association with Mother is brought to a culmination when, after his 
lesson has been learned, Mother’s motif is heard once again, heralding his 
achievement. The reappearance of her motif brings tonal, motivic and emotional 
resolution to the opera, and it is a significance we only fully understand 
retrospectively, as we will see. 
 Mother’s motif, underneath the speech-driven rhythms of the dialogue, is 
heard first in the woodwinds, and in transpositions of the same harmony, until (at 
Fig. 4) her disappointment is reflected by a change of orchestration to the strings, and 
a poignant minor 9th dissonance between the violins. The child’s replies (or lack of) 
to her questioning are made by a reappearance of the opening oboe solo motif. As 
Mother’s patience finally reaches its breaking point, her descending perfect melodic 
fourth motif appears again in the woodwinds, only distorted and corrupted as a 
tritone (at Fig. 6-4). Her last words ‘Think, think above all, of your Mother’s 
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chagrin!’189 are a premonition of the pervading influence she will exert over the 
remainder of the opera. 
 
 
Finale (Fig. 149+3 to the end) 
 
The animals’ calling out for Mother reaches a climax that finally summons her 
symbolic reappearance as a light at the window. Her motif, first stated at the 
beginning of the opera, is heard once more in a tutti threefold repetition at Fig. 149+3, 
the intensity of which slowly decays away into the halcyon choral fugato ‘Il est bon, 
l’Enfant, il est sage’. ‘Sage’ carries a double meaning – when it appeared in the 
beginning as Mother’s question ‘Bébé a été sage?’, it referred to good behaviour, 
whereas now it takes on a broader definition of ‘wise’, reflecting the emotional 
resolution of the Child’s journey. 
 The reappearance of Mother’s motif also signals a return to G major, the key 
in which the opera (ostensibly) began, which prepares the closing and returning 
function of the Finale. In addition, the final 11 bars (from Fig. 153) see the return of 
the opening oboe solo motif, which we associated with The Child, now displaced by 
a quaver and joined by two solo violins, and harmonised against a firm G major 
background. It is almost as if we are hearing the motif for the first time in its true 
form, in a glorious unification with Mother. Where Mother’s descending fourth was 
previously harmonised as a questioning cadence (Fig. 3+2), its final statement as the 
closing two chords of the opera appears as a final cadence in G major – a cadence 
which we can only retrospectively understand to have been anticipated since the 
opera began (Fig. 154+2). In addition, it is only at this point that the motif appears set 
to text and harmony simultaneously. 
 If we have associated Mother with her descending fourth motif from the 
beginning, then it follows that we might feel her presence when it appears in other 
contexts – this is, however, not to say that every instance of the descending fourth 
will yield significance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the descending fourth we associate 
with Mother, and its derivative as described above, appears in virtually every scene 
of the opera, albeit to varying degrees of prominence and fundamentality to the 
                                                            
189 «Songez, songez surtout, au chagrin de Maman!», 5. 
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music. If we also ascribe significance to its inversion and retrograde inversion, it 
appears all the more frequently. However, there are two particular instances where 
the descending fourth appears out of context that are of specific interest to us – in a 
sense they may be regarded as hermeneutic windows on the work.190 
 The first, identified by Langham Smith, is found in the Cat’s duet (see 
Example 4 below). 
 
Example 4 Mother’s melodic fourth (a) and ‘corrupted’ tritone (x) in 
‘Cats’ Duet’ (Fig. 97+1) 
 
 
Langham Smith notes that the ascription of Mother’s descending fourth motif to the 
female Cat, who in her scene engages in a sex act with the male Cat, implies an 
Oedipal association: ‘without reading in too much of the oedipal significance, it is 
remarkable that the female Cat shares the descending fourth associated with Mother, 
sung for the first time at the very end’.191 The implication here is that this apparent 
significance is nothing more than coincidence. 
 However, we might be inclined to disagree with Langham Smith and 
hypothesize some form of psychological significance; certainly, what appears to 
Langham Smith as a mere coincidence is of sufficient psychological resonance, 
psychobiographically speaking, that it must not go unchallenged. Knowledge of 
Ravel’s well-documented meticulousness and craftsman-like attention to detail (one 
needs only to call to mind Stravinsky’s description of Ravel as ‘the most perfect of 
Swiss clockmakers’192) is compelling reason enough to lead us to conclude that the 
structural implication of Mother and her descending fourth motif in this scene would 
not have escaped him, even if its psychological implication did. However, Ravel’s 
equally well-documented emotional pudeur, let alone conventions of taste, would 
have surely prohibited a public expression of Oedipal leanings. Therefore, we must 
                                                            
190 See footnote 155. 
191 Langham Smith, ‘Ravel’s Operatic Spectacles’, 206. 
192 The original source of this comment is untraced: see Nichols, Ravel, 1. 
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conclude that if there is a psychobiographical significance to this, it is entirely 
unconscious. 
 Further evidence that supports the notion this might not have been mere 
coincidence, which Langham Smith does not identify, is the descending fourth in 
‘Toi, le coeur de la rose...’ (see Example 5 on following page). This scene bears 
equal weight to the Cat’s duet in terms of its expression of psychosexual 
development. In the Cat’s duet, the Child witnesses a sex act; in the scene with the 
Princess, which immediately precedes ‘Toi, le coeur de la rose...’, the Child has been 
confronted with fundamental feelings of love and of lust towards the princess and 
has experienced rejection of them. Therefore, there is a further link between the 
appearance of the descending fourth here, and the Child’s burgeoning sexuality. 
These confrontations mark a crucial turning point in the opera’s narrative and the 
child’s psychological development, and it is interesting to note that both of the 
scenes are suddenly much less structurally and developmentally confined: the 
Princess’s scene is the longest of the opera thus far, and the Cat’s duet is structured 
as the consistent development of a small cell of musical material. 
Our examination of the depiction of Mother in L’Enfant – encompassing her 
direct portrayal in the second scene of the opera, subsequent indirect portrayals of 
her through the appearance of her motif/s and her contextualising influence on 
musical and narratological factors afforded by their proximity to these depictions – 
has uncovered the salient theme of development, manifested as a gradual transition 
from confinement to liberation, which unfolds as the opera progresses. This 
observation serves as a foundation upon which the psychological narrative of 
L’Enfant is based, and through this premise we can track the Child’s psychological 
progression by a focused analysis of the opera’s unfolding of textual and musical 
content.  
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Example 5 Melodic fourths in ‘Toi, le coeur de la rose’ (Fig. 74-2) 
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 These surface-level observations, though they inform our interpretation of the 
work, do not specifically address our psychobiographical concerns. The essential 
psychological content of the work itself as we have interpreted it will provide us, in 
the concluding section of this chapter, with a basis upon which to argue that Ravel 
may have engaged in a form of projective identification in the creation of L’Enfant. 
Linking together Ravel’s musical narrative and Colette’s textual narrative by 
exploring how the latter is more clearly articulated by the former is not enough to 
provide us with the psychobiographical information we seek; it is instead through the 
in-depth analysis of Ravel’s compositional process in certain key scenes that his 
personal psychological apparatus is revealed. 
 
 
Detailed musico-psychobiographical 
analysis 
 
This section focuses on two scenes that reveal concrete psychobiographical features 
beneath the surface-level musical articulation of the textual narrative. It is their 
function in relation to the psychological narrative of L’Enfant as interpreted above 
that will allow us to infer causal psychological relationships between Ravel’s 
psychology and L’Enfant. Ravel’s compositional choices, which as we will see are 
ostensibly made to give musical utterance to the subtleties of Colette’s libretto, 
appear to be latently encoded with fundamental features of his psychological 
apparatus. 
 
 
The Chairs’ Dance (Fig. 16 to Fig. 21) 
 
The first of the sortilèges to be encountered by the child are the Armchair and the 
Louis XV Bergère (another kind of armchair). Ravel presents the scene in which they 
appear as a dance: a grotesquely recast Baroque minuet. Ravel’s choice of the minuet 
form (‘menuet’ in French), commonplace in the repertory of French keyboard suites 
to which he was accustomed, is highly revealing as we will see. The features of this 
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particular minuet that are of most importance to us are its approximate ternary 
(ABA) form, its function as a dance and its indebtedness to the Baroque. 
 The rigid formality and stiffness of the dance 193  is reflected in the 
approximate ternary structure of the music (as outlined below in Table 5). In 
comparison to the more organic development of musical material exhibited most 
plainly in the latter half of the opera, the material in this scene is presented rather 
more disjointedly in keeping with the theme of structural restriction transitioning to 
liberation that we identified in the previous section. Indeed, strict ternary form itself 
positively resists musical development since the central B section is, by definition, 
framed by essentially the same musical material. 
 
Table 5 Description of approximate ternary structure of Scene 3 
Bar 1-10 11 12-20 21-27 28-34 
Section  A1 G.P. B A2 Codetta 
 
The harmonic structure of A1 is firmly grounded by diatonicism, despite the apparent 
chromaticism imparted by Ravel’s addition of pungently dissonant acciaccaturas. 
Ostensibly in G minor, the harmonic underpinning – most clearly outlined in the left 
hand of the piano – alternates between i–V7 for the first seven bars as the bass 
maintains a three-note ostinato figure, eventually semicadencing as vi–iio–ii+7–V. 
The middle-ground structural level of the B section describes a stepwise descending 
bass (C–Bb–A–Ab) upon which triads extending to the ninth degree are built, and the 
section ends with a perfect cadence that returns us to G minor. A2 is then presented 
with the essential content of A1 intact, save for a short codetta – perhaps in keeping 
with the traditional practice of ornamenting the A2 section of the opera seria ‘da 
capo’ aria. 
The extent of musical development in this scene is therefore minimal, but 
Ravel maintains interest by consistently decorating its deceptively simple framework 
with chromatically modifying harmonies, colourful ornamentation and by varying 
the orchestration. Carolyn Abbate addresses Ravel’s retranslation of an archaic form 
through modern harmonic and melodic practices in her analysis of the composer’s 
Tombeau de Couperin: 
                                                            
193 «une danse compassée», 9. 
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Ravel’s Tombeau de Couperin has been understood as 
neoclassic, a work by a twentieth-century composer in an old 
genre (the dance suite), borrowing obligatory features from 
François Couperin’s keyboard dances (rhythms and forms, 
characteristic ornaments) and clothing them in strange 
harmonies.194 
Abbate’s mention of neoclassicism in relation to these factors is significant, as we 
will see, as is her identification of Ravel with Couperin – Ravel’s musical ancestor. 
 The fundamental construction of this scene as a dance is also significant. To 
borrow a phrase from Abbate, we may explore its function as a ‘dance trope’195 to 
elucidate the meaning of Ravel’s frequent employment of dance throughout the 
opera. One obvious reason for Ravel’s extensive use of dance in L’Enfant was that 
Jacques Rouché originally commissioned Colette to write a libretto for a ‘ballet 
féerique’ intended for the Paris Opéra (as Colette relates, ‘There came a day when 
Monsieur Rouché invited me to write a libretto for a magic ballet’).196 Kamyar 
Atabai has also noted that Ravel explored the traditional eighteenth-century French 
form of the opéra-ballet, à la Couperin and Rameau.197 Indeed, Orenstein has 
described Ravel as ‘a descendant of Couperin, [Rameau] ... and, in general of the 
eighteenth-century French descriptive composers’.198 
 Factors of necessity and circumstance aside, commentators have posited more 
biographically orientated considerations in terms of Ravel’s use of dance forms. 
According to Mawer, in her discussion of Ravel’s employment of ballet in other 
works, the dance form 
offered Ravel a multidimensional projection of a dance; 
visual spectacle of exquisite elegance and beauty; a vehicle 
for fantasy and opportunity for distancing and detachment ... 
it was Ravel’s fascination with dance, itself a unifying vehicle 
                                                            
194 Abbate, ‘Outside Ravel’s Tomb’, 473, (accessed 6 October 2012). Emphasis 
added. 
195 Ibid., 471. 
196 Stuckenschmidt, Maurice Ravel, 206–7. 
197 Atabai, ‘L’Enfant et les sortilèges’, (accessed 17 August 2012). 
198 Orenstein, Ravel Man and Musician, 90. 
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for his wide-ranging explorations of classicism and 
exoticism, that led inexorably to ballet.199 
Mawer’s identification of the distancing and detaching qualities afforded by dance, 
as well as its link with ‘classicism’, which we will discuss in the next section, is of 
great psychological significance, as we will see. In addition, Mawer notes the 
‘obsession intrinsic to closed dance forms’,200 further reinforcing the idea of the 
closed structural form of the Chairs’ minuet. 
 Finally, Mawer intuits a biographical link between Ravel and the use of 
dance forms: 
Jankélévitch presented Ravel’s use of dance as a mask that 
enabled indirect expression and even falsehood in the 
feigning of indifference, the handling of allegory and 
contradiction. As an enclosed, often microcosmic, form, 
dance perhaps matches Ravel’s own need for internalisation 
and self-imposed limitation.201 
The nature of the dance tropes evoked in L’Enfant therefore simultaneously represent 
Ravel’s emotional distance from his work and his evocations of the past (by way of 
his employment of archaic dance forms). 
 The ‘formality’ of this scene is also significant as it appears to be connected 
to Ravel’s personal pudeur. The minuet’s cultural associations with ceremonial 
formality, as noted by Warren Darcy, 202 and aristocratic dignity, as noted by 
Meredith Ellis Little, 203  are propounded by Colette’s stage directions: ‘with a 
bow/curtsey’ and the chairs’ opening lines ‘Your humble servant, Bergère ... Your 
maidservant, Fauteuil’.204 The chairs’ behaviours towards each other emphasises a 
staid, impersonal, and emotionally detached atmosphere. 
 Thus far, three distinct variants of formality’ have been described: the 
                                                            
199 Mawer, ‘Ballet and the Apotheosis of the Dance’, 140–141. Emphasis added. 
200 Ibid., 140. 
201 Ibid., 141. 
202 Darcy, review of Classical Form, 125. 
203 Little, ‘Minuet’, in Grove Music Online (accessed 2 March 2013). 
204 «avec une reverence; Votre serviteur humble, Bergère ... Votre servante, 
Fauteuil», 9–10. 
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Baroque minuet form (in its cultural presentations, irreducibly linked to its attendant 
dance form), structural ternary form, and anthropomorphised interpersonal formality 
between the chairs themselves. Each articulates the concept of distance through their 
functions as masks or disguises, which (whether intended by Ravel or not) somehow 
act to create a detachment that acts along various planes of the work and its 
relationship to its creator. 
 Further means of distancing are achieved through the grotesque humour in 
this scene as provided by its sonorities. In describing the sonorous effects of this 
scene, Maria Kardos-Morin draws attention to 
the slightly trivial and grotesque timbres of the bassoons and 
contrabassoons, the burlesque effect of the minuet-like theme 
played on the piano with a luthéal attachment, the ridiculous 
tremolo of the flutes and the trembling trills of the small 
appoggiatura motifs in the English horns.205 
Ravel had intended both L’Enfant and Tzigane206 to be performed with luthéal, 
although the instrument used was destroyed in a fire at Salle Gaveau207 – in lieu of a 
luthéal attachment, the prefatory remarks to the score suggest an upright piano with 
sheets of paper between the strings.208 Ravel’s score is replete with exotic, grotesque, 
or ‘ridiculous’ sonorities: the double bass solo of the opening, played entirely in 
                                                            
205 Kardos-Morin, ‘L’Enfant et les Sortilèges ou le rève intérieur ravélien’, 22. The 
luthéal is a mechanism designed to be attached to a grand piano which, by means 
of bringing into action combinations of four available stops, modified the piano’s 
sound to produce a sonority similar to either a harpsichord, a muted harp or lute, 
or a dulcimer/cimbalom by using a combination of the two – the circled numbers 
(1–4) which appear in the piano part in the full score thus refer to these two stops, 
which are available in both the treble and bass registers of the piano to which the 
mechanism is attached; hence four stops. See Cotte, ‘Luthéal’, in Grove Music 
Online (accessed 1 March 2013). 
206 Composed and published in 1924, for violin and piano (with or without luthéal 
attachment) or violin and orchestra. 
207 MIM, ‘Pleyel grand piano with “Luthéal” mechanism’, (accessed 4 November 
2012). 
208 See prefatory performance notes in Durand miniature score. 
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harmonics, is one example, as are Ravel’s prescriptions for percussion instruments 
such as a ratchet, cheese grater, slide whistle and wind machine. These sonorities are 
employed to evoke or to imitate: the luthéal adds both a burlesque flavour and the 
sound of the harpsichord to the Chair’s evocation of the Baroque minuet; the slide 
whistle gives voice to the cries of screech owls in the prologue to the garden scene; 
the wind machine lends a foreboding quality to the music of the Trees. In other 
words, they are the sonorous personifications of the trompe l’oeils which 
Jankélévitch described as Ravel’s masks:209 aural effects which Ravel seems to 
employ as further devices for distancing and detachment by means of their 
evocations of ‘otherness’, to use Robert Orledge’s term.210 
 
 
The Comtoise Clock (Fig. 21 to Fig. 28) 
 
The narrative motif of temporal stasis announced in the previous scene finds its 
literal embodiment in the next. The music of this scene, presaging that of a 
Stravinskian emphasis on percussive sonorities and incisive rhythmic effects, 
persuasively depicts the chaotic chiming of the clock’s broken mechanism. Benoit 
van Langenhove has identified musical similarities to both Stravinsky and Puccini in 
this scene: 
Musically, Ravel translated ... disorder into a continuous 
hammering of notes on which fall heavy accents (a method 
derived from Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring). But Ravel also 
slips into a lyrical moment of sweetness à la Puccini on the 
line ‘I who [struck] those sweet hours’.211 
                                                            
209 See Mawer, ‘Introduction’, 1. 
210 Orledge, ‘Evocations of Exoticism’, 28. 
211 «Musicalement, Ravel traduit ... dérèglement par un martèlement continu de 
croches sur lesquelles tombent de violents accents (procédé issu du Sacre du 
printemps de Stravinsky). Mais Ravel glisse aussi un moment de douceur lyrique 
à la Puccini sur «Moi […] qui [sonnais] de douces heures»». Langenhove, 
‘L’Enfant et les sortilèges’, online (accessed 5 July 2012). 
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If the Clock’s music bears a resemblance to Puccini, it is interesting to note the 
Child’s lovesong’s resemblance to Massenet. Here, exceptionally, Ravel admitted 
tapping into French operatic tradition by basing the aria on ‘Adieu, notre petite 
table!’ from Massenet’s opera Manon, while modestly opining that ‘it’s better in 
Massenet!’212 This is another example of otherness employed by Ravel. 
The Comtoise clock, whose pendulum the child earlier broke off, dementedly 
paces the stage against a relentlessly driving crotchet rhythm that mirrors its inability 
to cease chiming. The clock sings at length of its inability to keep time because of 
the child’s actions. Symbolically, the child’s destructive actions have broken time 
itself, as embodied by the clock, thus simultaneously changing the linearity of time 
and the course of the narrative of the opera and reflecting the broken linearity of the 
Child’s emotional development. Ravel’s portrayal of mechanism, or more 
specifically a broken mechanism, therefore resonates symbolically with the 
psychology of the child. A natural extension of the neoclassical devices mentioned in 
the previous section, Puri’s comments on mechanism are revealing. Puri has taken 
note of the perception that Ravel approached music as mechanism and formulated a 
rationalist and constructivist poetics to produce schematic forms and quasi-
automated textures. Epitomized in Stravinsky’s famous comparison of Ravel to a 
Swiss clock- or watch-maker (horloger), the assertion of his tendency to treat 
musical composition as mechanical engineering forms part, as Deborah Mawer has 
noted, of ‘a neoclassical aesthetic founded on abstraction, manipulation, and 
reconstruction,’ as well as a tradition of craft.213 
If the formulation of music into mechanical structures gives rise to a ‘quasi-
automated’ texture, then the breaking down of that mechanism causes it to grind to a 
halt. In other words, were the clock not broken, the regular passage of time and the 
perpetuation of a stable and peaceful home environment would have been allowed to 
continue indefinitely: but this is not the case. Since we associate the Child’s 
destructive frenzy with his desire to punish Mother, and in turn we associate this 
with the close-mindedness of the Child, the consequences of both factors are 
embodied in this scene by its suggestion of temporal (and thus emotional) stasis, or 
confinement. In addition, the ‘shame and grief’ experienced by the Clock now 
                                                            
212 «c’est mieux chez Massenet!» Nichols, Ravel, 270. 
213 Puri, Ravel the Decadent, 121. Emphasis added. 
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becomes an implied lesson to the Child; that his psychological confinement is 
something that he should relate to with shame and grief. 
 If the Comtoise Clock, along with the other sortilèges, may be interpreted as 
a projection of the child’s ego, then the child’s destructive actions, or punishment of 
his mother, bring them into action. The Clock is animated, awoken from its stasis 
and put back into motion, as a psychological projection that must be dealt with 
(through Klein’s process of reparation) in order for the child’s psychology, and the 
narrative, to temporally progress. The sortilèges therefore can be seen to act as 
barometers to the child’s emotional progression, which remains static until such a 
point as he can learn and develop. The emotional stasis/symbolic stasis in the Child’s 
development, which is reflected in this scene as a temporal disruption, is carried over 
to other scenes. In order for us to locate the points at which this emotional stasis is 
overcome, we might assume that it would be possible to seek musical indicators in 
the structure of the opera. 
 
 
Ravel’s compositional aesthetic: distancing and 
psychology 
 
In this section, the psychological implications of what we have identified above will 
be explored further: we will consider Ravel’s compositional aesthetic (as we did in 
Chapter Four, but here in closer detail) and how commentators usually rationalise it, 
subsequently examining what we can do with it psychobiographically. 
 The minuet, which must be regarded as representative of Ravel’s aesthetic, 
appears to have been something of a favourite form of his, subject to frequent 
revision and perfection – it appears in no fewer than six works (L’Enfant excluded) 
despite his relatively small compositional output.214 In focusing on the narrow yet 
                                                            
214 These are: Menuet antique, Menuet sur le nom d’Haydn, the third movement of 
Sonatine, the fifth movement of Le tombeau de Couperin and, according to 
Nichols’s catalogue of Ravel’s works, a recently discovered Menuet composed in 
1904; all of which are originally for solo piano. The Menuet of 1904 was 
posthumously published in 2008, and details of its first performance are unknown. 
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abundant category of the minuet in Ravel’s compositional output, we evince a central 
theme to Ravel’s aesthetic – that of perpetually looking to the musical past in order 
to borrow structural models and genres of composition (Orledge describes this as 
Ravel’s ‘culte du passé’, 215  or ‘cult of the past’). The prevalence of modern 
reworkings of archaic musical forms in the composer’s output may, at first glance, 
appear to be a superficial feature of his compositional aesthetic. However, although 
commentators have connected Ravel’s predilection for past forms to an aesthetic 
distancing in both his personal and culturally–situated aesthetics, 
psychobiographically (via L’Enfant) we are able posit deeper psychological 
resonances. 
Musical neoclassicism, more an aesthetic trend than an organised cultural 
movement of the early twentieth century, is commonly thought to have emerged in 
part as a reaction to Romantic excesses of emotion and of scale/physical means, and 
of tendencies to destroy tonality and form. It describes an attempt to bring order and 
restraint back to music that appeared to be on the verge of the uncontrollable, and 
musical neoclassical ideals became a precursor to serialism’s uncompromising 
subjection of musical material to rigorous formal restrictions. Composers associated 
with neoclassicism thus appeared to return to Classical conceptions of musical order 
(as opposed to disorder) and contrived formal constructions, in the process often 
drawing direct inspiration from ‘conventional’ antiquarian formal models. 
 This manifesto certainly seems to resonate with the aesthetic precepts 
apparent in Ravel’s music, especially that of L’Enfant. Certainly, the opera makes 
frequent reference to classical and antiquarian formal models, as well as exhibiting 
what Barbara Kelly terms dépouillement, a stripping-back or economisation of 
means. 216  Ravel’s dépouillement in L’Enfant is perhaps most apparent in the 
opening, where the required forces comprise a sparse quartet of soloists (two oboes, 
a double bass, and the Child) for almost two minutes, and in the Princess’s scene 
with her extended duet with a solo flute. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
In addition, Ravel also made an orchestration of Chabrier’s Menuet pompeux in 
1919. See Nichols, Ravel, 399–402. 
215 Orledge, ‘Evocations of Exoticism’, 46. 
216 Kelly, ‘History and Homage’, 25; see also Kilpatrick, ‘The Language of 
Enchantment: Childhood and Fairytale in the Music of Maurice Ravel’, 135. 
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 For the moment, and for convenience, let us refer to these aspects of Ravel’s 
compositional aesthetic as neoclassical. The question is how do these neoclassical 
elements present in Ravel’s music inform our psychobiographical understanding of 
Ravel and his music? In order to answer this question, we must attempt to explain 
this particular facet of Ravel’s compositional aesthetic – an aesthetic that, as we saw 
in Chapter Four, also bled into his personal life. 
 Kelly’s assessment of the neoclassical elements in Ravel’s compositional 
aesthetic, including his focus on the classical forms and styles of the past, on 
emotional restraint and distance and, less significantly, the use of bitonality, provides 
a very useful overview of critical commentary on these elements; Ravel’s own 
comments on his compositional aesthetic also make apt reading. Kelly begins her 
article with two revealing quotes – Ravel said that ‘One should not expect a 
composer’s works to be entirely personal creations, offering no analogy whatever 
with the achievements of his predecessors’,217 and ‘An artist should be international 
in his judgments and aesthetic appreciations and incorrigibly national when it comes 
to the province of creative art’.218 What do these quotes say? These tell us the what, 
which is already apparent in his music, but not the why. Certainly, his open 
acknowledgement of these facts demonstrates that Ravel made a conscious decision 
to write in this way (although we need not dwell on Ravel’s conscious decisions, but 
concentrate on what may have been unconscious ones that seem 
paradoxical/mysterious). 
 According to Kelly, ‘Ravel spoke of the two essential components of a 
composer’s make-up: individual consciousness and national consciousness, the 
former amounting to the composer’s individuality and the latter to his link with a 
national tradition.’219 This provides us with a useful if somewhat arbitrary division 
between the reasons identified by various commentators for Ravel’s neoclassical 
compositional aesthetics – national tradition and nationalism, and individual creative 
consciousness. 
                                                            
217 Ravel, ‘Fervaal’, 359. Also quoted in Kelly, ‘History and Homage’, 7. 
218 Downes, ‘Mr. Ravel Returns’, 458. Also quoted in Kelly, ‘History and Homage’, 
7. 
219 Kelly, ‘History and Homage’, 7. 
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Explanations for Ravel’s persistent looking to the past have been sought in 
the characteristics of the cultural milieu to which Ravel belonged. Ravel’s 
contemporaries were all, to different extents, influenced by the aftermath of the First 
World War, leading to the development of a particular French strain of neoclassicism 
(another influential strain developed simultaneously in Germany). Interwar cultural 
consciousness was concerned with rebuilding a patriotic national consciousness, and 
Kelly points out that Ravel regarded the French spirit as naturally classical in 
character.220 Indeed, Jane Fulcher has argued that ‘neoclassicism in wartime and the 
twenties was no “Zeitgeist”, it was the “national style,” synonymous with patriotism, 
which made it a matrix for political dissension’.221 Messing too has argued that the 
First World War provided the catalyst for Ravel’s renewed interest in older forms 
and styles.222 Cultural consciousness would therefore appear to be a significant 
causal factor, although, very interestingly, Ravel’s neoclassic aesthetic persisted even 
when the trend had passed, which suggests that this aesthetic was not completely 
dictated by prevailing taste. Kelly observes that ‘In the early 1920s, Milhaud, 
Poulenc and Auric regarded Ravel with distain, harshly criticising what they 
regarded as his “outmoded” aesthetic.’223 In relation to L’Enfant, even Ravel himself 
pre-empted criticism: ‘I can assure you that this work in two sections will distinguish 
itself by a mélange of styles which will be severely judged’.224 
As Kelly argues, ‘Ravel viewed the model as the external trapping, shielding 
the inner emotion of the work; detachment from the subject did not equate with 
insensitivity, charge frequently directed his own work.’225 If Ravel’s pudeur was the 
result of his shielding the inner emotion of the work, the questions become ‘what 
was he shielding?’ and ‘why?’ This mystery may have been the kernel of curiosity in 
Marguerite Long’s tantalising question: ‘What secret grief did he nourish?’226 Might 
                                                            
220 Ibid., 18. 
221 Fulcher, ‘The Composer as Intellectual’, 198. 
222 Kelly, ‘History and Homage’, 22. 
223 Ibid., 25. 
224 Jourdan-Morhange, Ravel et Nous, 123. 
225 Kelly, ‘History and Homage’, 10. Emphasis added. 
226 Long, At the Piano with Ravel, 117–119. Also quoted in Nichols, Ravel 
Remembered, 32. 
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this ‘secret grief’ be the fundamental childhood conflict Klein was referring to? From 
what was he distancing himself? Were his acts of distancing more than just 
superficial literary/artistic tastes? Is there a deeper psychological resonance? The 
psychobiographical solution to these questions is to ‘superimpose the life on the art’ 
– to look for an answer in L’Enfant. 
 
 
Psychobiographical outcomes 
 
In the analyses of the two scenes above – still only really the beginning of the opera 
– we have observed several musical parameters which serve to create a sense of 
emotional distance between the work and its creator, and which articulate within the 
narrative of the opera itself the Child’s developmental stasis and psychological 
confinement (these are dance/baroque/form/formality/humour/sonority/mechanism). 
Most importantly, we have proposed that these parameters were not just a result of a 
cultural expectation, but were of psychological origin. While the narrative develops, 
the devices for distancing do not: they are present throughout. We have seen that 
Ravel’s persistence in looking to the past and distancing himself from his work 
appears to signify something of great psychobiographical significance, however 
veiled his intentions. As a result, we can look to L’Enfant and the musical 
psychology it describes – and indeed, projective identification – to resolve this 
mystery. 
As James Grotstein has argued in his assessment of Wilfred Bion’s 
contributions to psychoanalysis 
projective identification, as Klein understood it, helps us to 
understand the infant’s fate in being confronted by objects 
that are suffused with his projections … the operation of 
projective identification [originates] in the infantile portion of 
the projecting subject’s personality and complexly 
resonat[es] within the personality of the object.227 
                                                            
227 Grotstein, ‘Projective Transidentification: An Extension of the Concept of 
Projective Identification’, 188. Emphasis added. 
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In these terms, projective identification describes the process by which the Child of 
L’Enfant associates with – and therefore learns from – the objects into which he has 
projected his anger and frustration at Mother. We saw from Klein’s analysis that the 
Child also appears to experience processes of psychological resolution common to 
the infantile phases of development she observed in her analyses of children. As 
such, projective identification clearly operates within the narrative of the opera. 
However, in our earlier reformulation of the concept to apply to the 
composer-as-subject, we proposed that the process might operate between a 
composer and their work. As Losseff argued in her formulation of the concept, 
projective identification may describe a therapeutic process in which, as a musical 
work reaches a narratologically satisfying conclusion, so too resolve the parts of the 
self the subject has projected into that work: she states that this is ‘because the tracts 
of music which interpreters identify with their feelings (and into which they have 
projected their feelings) eventually resolve, so might their feelings resolve with 
them’).228 In L’Enfant – which itself describes a psychological process of infantile 
resolution which is inextricably linked to its musical narrative – the resolution in the 
last scene, both tonal and motivic, of the content of the first describes a musical 
narratological resolution that operates across the entire span of the opera. We 
observed a musical connection between Mother and the Child’s aggression in the 
opening scenes of the opera. An examination of the unfolding structural articulation 
of the narrative revealed its parallel to the Child’s transition from psychological 
conflict to resolution. We also saw how Mother’s musical signatures pervaded these 
same structural articulations. Therefore, the structural and musical resolution of the 
Child’s emotional confinement was demonstrated to be inextricably linked to 
Mother. In other words, the Child’s emotional development was defined almost 
entirely by her. 
Ravel (perhaps unconsciously) articulated processes of reparation, projective 
identification and Oedipal conflict that described again processes which may have 
been active in his personal relationship with his mother. We saw in Chapter Four that 
Ravel’s relationship with his mother was a pervasive influence throughout his life, 
which never fully resolved, and we have seen in this chapter that the Child’s 
emotional conflict in the opera does resolve. Therefore, it is possible to argue that 
                                                            
228 Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 56. 
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Ravel engaged in a form of projective identification with L’Enfant, perhaps 
unconsciously, in an act of catharsis or (to use the Jungian term) abreaction. The 
opera’s proximity – both chronological and emotional – to the death of Ravel’s 
mother in 1917 reinforces the notion that this may have been the case: it is difficult 
to doubt Ravel’s sincere psychological investment in L’Enfant. I would argue, in 
Anthony Storr’s terms, Ravel’s ‘imagin[ing] himself to be inside some object 
external to himself’229 occurs in L’Enfant given these significances.  
 Additionally, if, as Losseff argued, ‘some forms of interpretation are a 
projective identification of the interpreter’s own psychological processes into the 
music’ and that ‘the musical work [performed in her formulation, but written in 
mine] [then] becomes in effect a narrative of the self’, 230  Ravel’s projective 
identification with L’Enfant may not only explain his emotional pudeur in L’Enfant, 
but his pudeur elsewhere in his oeuvre and indeed his life. We are able to posit this 
link since the use of distancing devices in L’Enfant articulate an infantile emotional 
journey inextricably connected to Mother – a journey with which Ravel projectively 
identified – and these distancing devices pervaded his entire emotional life. 
Therefore, the use of distancing devices elsewhere in Ravel’s life and his work 
appears to be tinged with psychological significance. The fact that L’Enfant employs 
distancing devices via stasis in order to articulate the narrative of the Child’s 
emotional development with respect to his mother, and the notion that Ravel 
projectively identified with it, assumes this: that the detachment and distance in 
L’Enfant is the result of (or, at the very least, can be read in terms of) Ravel’s 
relationship to his mother. Therefore, the mystery of the work (Ravel’s distance and 
pudeur in his compositional aesthetic) and the life (Ravel’s infantile attachment to 
his mother) are resolved against each other.  
                                                            
229 Storr, Music and the Mind, 106. Also quoted in Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, 
Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 53. 
230 Losseff, ‘Projective Identification, Musical Interpretation and the Self’, 54. 
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6 
Conclusions and outlook for 
research 
 
 
 Answering the ‘vexed question’ 
 
We began this thesis by proposing to readdress Solomon’s ‘vexed question’ of ‘how 
– or whether – the pathways between life and art [could] be mapped, whether a 
“personal” factor in creativity [could] be identified’,231 and with the premise that 
biographical insight in musicological enquiry could be formulated into a 
methodology that offered to answer Solomon’s question positively. Most 
importantly, this thesis has suggested that psychobiography offers to enrich and 
deepen our interpretation of musical works. 
 Solomon’s remarks concerned musicology’s acceptance of biography as an 
interpretive tool. We identified that musical biographies often proposed illuminating 
links between a composer’s life and their work, and so the question then focused on 
why critical musicology, and traditional musicology before it, had not accepted 
biography (we did, however, note that critical musicology has addressed issues such 
as gender and sexuality in its interpretations, which pertain in general terms to a 
composer’s biography, but the focus of this thesis was one concerning the specific 
details of the life). Critical musicology’s rejection of specific biographical insight 
seemed surprising, therefore, given that the conceptual essence of critical musicology 
was in part defined by a renewed emphasis on subjectivity – the human subject. 
 In our analysis of the relationship between traditional musicology and 
biographical insight, we concluded that one of the central factors defining its view of 
biography as a form of illegitimate scholarship was that biographical insight was not 
                                                            
231 Solomon, ‘Biography’, in Grove Music Online (accessed 5 May 2010). 
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empirically verifiable enough to be critically integrated with musicology. In 
identifying the criterion of empirical verification, we uncovered an important facet of 
the conceptual regime in which traditional musicology was situated – one which 
propounded the musical work’s autonomy, objectivity, and cultural transcendence. 
 In order to address the necessity of critical and theoretical rigour, we 
proposed that psychobiography be employed in place of traditional conceptions of 
biography. This became the focus of the second chapter, in which psychobiography 
was defined as a more critically reliable discipline. In addition, we noted that critical 
musicology (and, in particular, hermeneutic musicological enquiry) was defined by 
an ethos designed to represent an alternative to the dogmatism and empiricism of 
older musicologies, and we explored how psychobiography correlated with these 
ideological goals. Despite this, critical musicology was still constrained by certain 
ideologies it had inherited from traditional musicology, and more broadly by 
poststructuralist literary philosophies concerning the debunking of authorial 
intention. 
 Our discussion then took as its focus the essays of Roland Barthes and 
Michel Foucault, both of which were connected by a mutual desire to shift the focus 
in criticism away from the author and toward the text instead. This desire arose since 
a focus on the author appeared to accord him/her with an interpretive monopoly over 
their works, with the implication that s/he had privileged access to the true meaning 
of his/her works; clearly, this perception had a limiting effect on interpretive 
possibilities. Rather than refuting Barthes and Foucault, it was argued that the 
ideological systems that were in place at the time they wrote their respective essays 
were no longer in force, and that in any case musico-psychobiography did not seek to 
limit the interpretive creativity of the recipient simply because it reintroduced an 
emphasis on the author. 
 The theories of reception we addressed were too designed to shift focus in 
criticism away from the author, but they were predominantly concerned with 
relocating the meaning of a work to the history of its reception over time. This 
reader/recipient-centric approach was more in tune with the reinstatement of 
subjectivity to which critical musicology leaned, despite its shift away from the 
author. Once again, we concluded that theories of reception need not be refuted since 
musico-psychobiography acknowledges the importance of the reader’s interpretive 
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actions (as Schultz puts it, psychobiography amounts to ‘one seeking mind, armed 
with theory and research, directed at the details of another’).232 
 In the concluding section to Part One, we explored the concept of projective 
identification since it would become an important psychobiographical tool in Part 
Two, and focused in particular on Nicky Losseff’s reformulation of the concept to 
the scenario of the performer and the musical work. In order to theorise a connection 
between the composer and the musical work, we posited a further reformulation of 
projective identification. 
 Part Two began with an exploration of psychobiographical themes in Ravel’s 
life and his opera L’Enfant et les sortilèges. Utilising Schultz’s adaptation of Irving 
Alexander’s primary indicators of psychological saliency, we identified that Ravel’s 
relationship with his mother, and the emotional distance exhibited in his work and 
life were two salient features of psychobiographical significance. The purpose of our 
practical application of psychobiographical theory then became the elucidation of 
some connection between these salient themes. 
 The penultimate chapter of the thesis therefore represented a culmination of 
the knowledge gained in the preceding chapters. To begin, we divided the discussion 
into an examination of the psychological transition between symbolic 
conflict/confinement/stasis to resolution in the work followed by a discussion of its 
significance with respect to Ravel’s life. 
 We found that the musical process from conflict to resolution in L’Enfant was 
suffused with musical and psychological symbols of the Mother – given Losseff’s 
formulation of projective identification, we concluded that Ravel may have engaged 
in a form of projective identification with the work since it resolves both musically 
and psychologically, and that the Child’s resolution of an infantile psychological 
conflict may have provided Ravel with a vehicle by which to live out such a 
resolution that he himself may not have experienced in his life. In addition, we 
connected the other saliency of detachment and distancing to the devices in the opera 
used to articulate the psychological narrative, concluding that these devices may 
have been of a psychological origin, strongly pertaining to Ravel’s relationship with 
his Mother. In doing this, we demonstrated a clear connection between the life and 
the work, thus answering Solomon’s ‘vexed question’ in the affirmative. 
                                                            
232 Schultz, ‘Introducing Psychobiography’, 3. 
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Puri’s concluding remarks in his recent (2012) review of Roger Nichols’s 
Ravel contains the following advice on ‘pinning down’ Ravel: 
Nichols is right: Ravel is like Scarbo, perhaps even more than 
he acknowledges. Not only is the dandy-composer generally 
‘difficult to pin down’, he also likes to disavow the most 
strenuous exertions and extricate himself from the knottiest 
entanglements with a mere wave of the hand…. Should we 
find this capriciousness exasperating, we can take solace in 
its reminder to keep as many interpretative possibilities in 
play as possible, even at the risk of overturning a few 
conventional wisdoms.233 
While Deborah Mawer’s The Cambridge Companion to Ravel (published in 2000) 
aims to secure a solid foundation for Ravel studies in the twenty-first century,234 the 
nature of its analyses help us to chart the progression of Ravel scholarship over the 
past decade or so, and they allow us to situate the state of criticism surrounding 
Ravel within the context of postmodern thought. Mawer’s book, which celebrated 
the 125th anniversary of Ravel’s birth, interprets his music and compositional 
aesthetic with regard to its cultural context as a central focus: it aimed to offer 
something of a reassessment of Ravel scholarship at the start of the new millennium. 
Mawer’s introduction explains that the subjects of Ravel’s aesthetic, musical style 
and reception are treated in their historical contexts, ‘endorsing rhythmic, harmonic, 
motivic and voice-leading analytical enquiries’.235 
 Puri’s review of Nichols’s Ravel, on the other hand, dwells on biographical 
matters more closely resonant to psychobiography: 
the issue of Ravel’s dandyism [and] its potential importance 
to Ravel studies can hardly be overestimated. Despite its 
complexity, its deliberate conflation of life and art should be 
an extremely attractive prospect for scholars interested in 
pursuing biography and musical analysis simultaneously and 
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234 Mawer, ‘Introduction’, 4. 
235 Ibid., 3. 
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exploring the consequences of their mutual implication.236 
Mawer’s The Cambridge Companion to Ravel contends that ‘the mysteries [of 
Ravel] are real and detailed musical enquiries must continue.’237 It is reasonable to 
propose that musico-psychobiography, shown here in this thesis as an interpretive 
tool that yields significant critical insights, merits inclusion in future Ravel 
scholarship, and perhaps critical musicology as a whole.  
                                                            
236 Puri, review of Ravel, 620. Emphasis added. 
237 Mawer, ‘Introduction’, 4. 
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